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THE CUBAN CLAIMS ACT: PROGRESS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A VIABLE
VALUATION PROCESS IN THE FCSC
Michael W. Gordon*
INTRODUCTION
Foreign corporations face a continuing threat of intervention
through inter- and intra-national conflict. The experience of the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in dealing with the claims
of United States nationals for property expropriated by the Cuban
government may be helpful to attorneys whose clients face similar
problems in future foreign nationalizations or whose properties
are involved in foreign wars.
Claimants whose property was expropriated by Cuba have
had three primary alternatives to pursue: litigation, sharing in a
lump sum settlement with Cuba to be negotiated by the govern-
ment, or satisfaction from a national fund created by Congress.
Litigation requires reliance upon the unforeseen discovery of
properties of the Cuban government in the United States, fol-
lowed by attachment and adjudication in one of many possible
forums, with subsequent execution and sale. As a means of satis-
fying a claim arising from Cuban nationalizations, this method is
often prohibitively expensive for the individual claimant and, at
best, highly speculative. Compounded by the problems of sov-
ereign immunity and the act of state doctrine, litigation is clearly
an inadequate method for obtaining even a modicum of compen-
sation for any significant number of claimants. Additionally,
court actions favor those few banking institutions in which Cuba
possessed creditor interests.' For the vast majority of claimants,
no such deposits or potentially attachable assets exist.
A Congressional compensation fund is unlikely. While sev-
eral proposals were introduced in the Congress to reimburse
* B.S., J.D., University of Connecticut; M.A. Trinity College; Dipl. de
Droit Compare, Strasbourg. The author wishes to thank one of his students,
John Tolson, for assistance in some of the initial research for this article.
1. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972).
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United States claimants for losses in Cuba, none met with suc-
cess.
2
Satisfaction of the greater number of individual claims, in
the absence of a viable adjudicatory structure within Cuba, com-
bined with a willingness to settle the claims, must evolve from
some form of nationally administered claims settlement program
in the United States. The claims legislation ultimately approved
by Congress was considerably more conservative than several of
the original proposals. The final progeny of the initial proposals
was the addition of Title V, commonly referred to as the Cuban
Claims Act, to the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949.1
The new Title utilized existing procedures and structures for the
settlement of claims, encompassing the adjudicatory capacities of
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.4 The FCSC was
not created as a regulatory agency in the same context as the other
administrative agencies in the government. Its essential function
is one of adjudication of those claims defined in the enabling leg-
islation: claims essentially arising from the taking of property
of United States nationals by a foreign nation. Formation of
the FCSC brought a semblance of continuity to the area of settle-
ments, since the plan was prospectively designed to carry out the
adjudication of all future lump sum settlements.5
THE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT COMMISSION
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission is the most re-
cent version of a long history of changing organizational strata
2. H.R. 10327, submitted to the House on March 10, 1964, sought to pro-
vide for the determination and payment of Cuban claims, with that portion of
uncompensated claims accepted as collateral for federal loans to the claimants.The payment of the immediately compensable portion of the claims would havebeen made from assets found in the United States and blocked under the CubanAssets Control Regulations of July 8, 1963. See 31 C.F.R. Pt. 515 (1966). It
was estimated in 1964 that such fund might total $60 million, a sum even thenknown to be but a fraction of the expected total claims of $1.52 to $2 billion.See Hearings on Claims of U.S. Nationals Against the Government of CubaBefore the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 144 (1964).
3. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643-43k (1970).
4. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1954, 68 Stat. 1279 (1954). The Presi-dent of the United States, on April 29, 1954, indicated that the Plan:provides a single agency for the orderly completion of present claimsprograms. In addition, it provides an effective organization for the
settlement of future authorized claims programs by utilizing the ex-perience gained by present claims agencies. It provides unified ad-
ministrative direction of the functions concerned, and it simplifies the
organizational structure of the executive branch.
14 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 89 (Jan.-June 1961).
5. A feature carried over from the International Claims Settlement Act,
22 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1970).
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for the resolution of foreign property disputes. The impelling
factor leading to the establishment of claims commissions has been
the severe international conflicts of the first half of this century.
World Wars I and II were the impetus for the major claims pro-
grams in the United States until the initiation of the Cuban and
Communist China programs, although the nation had experience
in foreign claims which dates to shortly after independence. The
Jay Treaty of 1794, between the United States and Great Britain,'
utilized mixed claims commissions composed of representatives of
the United States, the foreign nation which was involved in the
claim and a third neutral nation. The mixed claims commission
established by the Jay Treaty proved unable to cope with national-
istic sensitivities and soon was discarded in favor of a national
claims commission.7 A lump sum settlement with France in 1803
resulted in the United States establishing its first national claims
commission.' This initial commission, established informally
without legislation, was followed during the next century by a
series of national claims commissions to distribute funds received
under treaties with Great Britain, Brazil, China, Denmark,
France, Mexico, Peru, the Two Sicilies, and Spain.9 Subsequent
to World War I, mixed claims commissions were again utilized
in an attempt to resolve claims of United States nationals for
property lost or damaged during the conflict.'"
The Relative Merits of National and Mixed Claims Commissions
The decisions evolving from these mixed claims commissions
6. 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 245 (H. MILLER ED. 1931) [hereinafter cited as MILLER,
TREATIES].
7. See R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NA-
TIONAL COMMISSIONS 7 (1962) [hereinafter cited as LILLIcH, CLAIMS ADJUDICA-
TION].
8. Convention with France, April 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 208 (1803), T.S. No.
86-B, 2 Miller, Treaties 516.
9. See LILLICH, CLAIMS ADJUDICATION 8.
10. See Agreement for a Mixed Commission with Germany, Aug. 10, 1922,
[1922] T.S. No. 665. See generally Griffin, International Claims of Nationals
of both the Claimant and Respondent States-The Case History of a Myth, 1
INT'L 1AwYER 400, 420 (1967). Other mixed arbitral tribunals evolved follow-
ing World War I, essentially the outgrowth of various treaties allowing nationals
to file claims with the commissions created by the treaties. Commissions were
established by, inter alia, Britain-Germany, France-Germany, France-Turkey and
Bulgaria-Greece. See Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes
(1920-25). The use of mixed claims commissions following an international
military engagement is obviously substantially dominated by the victor with its
ability to impress upon the defeated nation the justice of providing for war
reparations. It differs significantly from the Cuban experience, where interna-
tional pressures have reduced the ability of the more powerful nation whose
claimants await compensation, to resort to effective arm twisting to encourage
settlement.
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were marred by frequent disagreement. Commission members
were often inexperienced in the operation of such a sensitive ad-judicatory body and the national bias of the participants fre-
quently clashed.11 Decisions occasionally had to be rendered by
an umpire when the United States and German commissioners
were deadlocked in their deliberation. 2 Even when an agree-
ment was reached, there was no assurance of payment. The
agreement providing for the mixed commission contained no pro-
vision for the satisfaction of claims.' 3 Consequently, while the
establishment of a commission avoided problems associated with
the utilization of diplomatic channels to resolve the dispute, those
channels were in fact exhumed for the enforcement of decisions
and awards. Indeed, without an effective enforcement mecha-
nism, the most efficient of claims adjudicatory machinery is ren-
dered valueless to the claimant.
The difficulties made apparent by the ineffectiveness of the
mixed claims commissions were evaluated in developing a more
effective procedure for the resolution of subsequent international
claims. The nationality conflicts which had reduced the effec-
tiveness of the mixed claims commissions were eliminated, or
perhaps more accurately transferred to a different stage, by the
creation of national claims commissions composed entirely of
members of the claimant nation. These members would hear and
adjudicate claims subsequent to a lump sum settlement, at which
time national sensitivities would appear. A crucial distinction be-
tween the forms of commissions is that the mixed claims commis-
sions had to hear each individual claim, while the negotiation for
a lump sum settlement to be distributed involved solely the discus-
sion of an amount which would then be distributed as the collecting
nation's national claims commission determined.
A further deficiency of the mixed claims commissions is that
they were neither organized nor staffed to handle the volume of
claims generated by such situations as the Cuban nationalizations.
Under the Cuban Claims Act, 5,911 awards were made as of
11. Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Its Functions andJurisdiction, 60 MicH. L. REV. 1079, 1084 (1962).
12. id. citing the initial decision of the Mixed Claims Commission, which
stated, "PARKER, Umpire, rendered the decision of the Commission, the Ameri-
can Commissioner and the German Commissioner being unable to agree. .. ."Consolidated Edition of Decisions and Opinions, Mixed Claims Commission,
United States and Germany 1925-26 at 1 (1927).
13. See Agreement, note 10 supra. The German government, under theDawes Plan in 1924, did agree to make annual installments for the reparations
agreed upon by the Mixed Claims Commission. See Hearings on War Claims
and Enemy Property Legislation Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1961) (Statement of
Dr. Edward D. Re, Chairman, FCSC).
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June 30, 1972.14 It is unlikely that a mixed claims commission
could adequately have adjudicated this volume of claims in the
period of time required by the Foreign Claims Settlement Act.
The aggregate amount of the claims allowed by the FCSC in the
Cuban case of June 30, 1972, was $1,760,124,172.08.", This
figure obviously far exceeds any conceivable future settlement.
As international claims necessarily involve the interplay of
two legal systems, a commission composed solely of nationals of
either nation, particularly nationals of the country whose in-
vestors were subjected to the nationalization, may be unable to
effectively determine the fair value of their nationals' property.
Undoubtedly, the ultimate pro rata disbursement of whatever
funds become available will favor some claimants over others be-
cause of inherent inconsistencies in adjudication. Moreover, if it
is assumed that a mixed claims commission would have weighed
facts in evidence and resolved the various claims in a substantive
manner different from a national commission, further inconsist-
encies become apparent. Members of mixed claims commissions
who are representatives of the nationalizing country will natu-
rally tend to have a subconscious bias on the side of conservative
methods of evaluation, while members from the country whose
citizens were expropriated may be expected to lean toward liber-
ality. Where difficult claims cause normally latent nationalistic
sensitivities to become more overt, the subconscious bias may be-
come a conscious adversary-like attitude.
The result of a national commission will most assuredly be
a yield of higher total amount than the aggregate likely to emanate
from a mixed commission. The main concern is whether certain
elements of valuation would significantly differ in the two com-
missions. For example, a mixed claims commission might con-
sider land to be of greater value than would the national claims
commission, while both might use similar criteria for choses in ac-
tion. Thus, where the final distribution is a pro-rata apportion-
ment, those claimants with choses in action claims will fare better
under the national claims commission than those with real prop-
erty claims.
In the case of Cuba, however, it was not so much a matter
of choosing the best form, but of utilizing the only form avail-
able. Where there is a breach of diplomatic relations between the
two countries, the possibility of a mixed claims commission is
14. Letter from Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to this writer dated
November 15, 1972. As of December 31, 1971, 1,192 claims had been wholly
denied. 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 35.
15. lId. at 25.
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predictably exiguous. If political issues, such as existed in the
Romanian settlement of 1960, become paramount, it is impossible
to establish a judicial atmosphere in which the commissioners may
operate. The result is an adversary proceeding between the rep-
resentatives of the two nations with the third party member in the
role of an arbitrator. When the case is as extreme as that in
Cuba, even the utilization of a national claims commission be-
comes questionable, since no suggestions of a lump sum settle-
ment have been forthcoming from Cuba. The benefits of the
pre-adjudication aspects of the national commission, however, are
evidenced by the determination of claims while parties and data
are available and fresh.'"
Members of a national claims commission may well have an
easier role in utilizing fairness as a standard. One's continued
service as a commission member is not threatened by a national
asset-conservation approach. A member on a mixed claim com-
mission from the nationalizing country, however, may view his
security as a commission member as directly proportional to his
ability to reject claims.
The temporary nature of the national claims commissions
subjects this format to the same complaints addressed to mixed
claims commissions. Their transitory nature and inability to es-
tablish procedures lends a degree of ineffectiveness. During the
last decade, however, significant attempts have been made at doc-
umenting past experience and suggesting improvements to pro-
cedures for the settlement of international claims.'"
During the interim between World War I and World War II,both national claims commissions and mixed claims commissions
were utilized by the United States to resolve property disputes.18
16. See text accompanying note 27 inIra.
17. The works edited, and often authored by Professor Richard C. Lillich,
under the title The Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, have been
a particularly valuable contribution in this area. See generally, R. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS (1962);
R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSEN, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND
PRESENTATION (1962); R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964); G. WHITE, THE USE OF EXPERTS BY INTERNA-
TIONAL TRIBUNALS (1965); R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT: SIX PROCEDURAL STUDIES (1965); R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
POST-WAR BRITISH PRACTICE (1967); B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POST-
WAR FRENCH PRACTICE (1971); 1. FOIGHEL, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POST-WAR
DANISH PRACTICE (1972); F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL
TRIBUNALS, AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS (1971).
18. See also LILLICH, CLAIMS ADJUDICATION 8-11; Griffin, supra note 10
at 421-22. Professor Lillich suggests that the failure of the mixed commissions
with Mexico to resolve disputes was the significant factor leading to the ultimate
adoption by the United States of the National Claims Commission as the primary
method of claims determination. Id. at 11.
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While the lump sum settlement format might suggest less
than complete indemnification,' 9 the advantages of the procedures
of national claims commissions had become apparent by World
War II, and claims following that war were resolved primarily by
national claims commissions.20 Indeed, the national claims com-
mission was almost uniformly to replace the mixed claims com-
mission as the prevailing format for the settlement of international
claims involving United States claimants.2' Certainly, the diffi-
culties of the mixed claims commissions in overriding national
interest would have been aggravated had that procedure been
followed in post-World War II adjudications. In Latin America,
as well as other Third World nations, increasing nationalism has
effectively ruled out the utilization of international forums for the
adjudication of property disputes. Arbitration as a method of re-
solving major disputes between the Third World and developed
nations has failed to achieve a significant role. 2 The increasing
bi-polarization of the Third World and the capital exporting world
does stress the need for an international adjudication process, but
also evidences the extreme difficulty in establishing adjudicatory
processes acceptable to the Third World nations.
The lump sum settlement and national claims commissions
seem to have found a firm foothold. The politics and sensitivities
of only one nation are involved in the determination of indi-
vidual claims. As Lillich illustrates, countries have indicated
a preference for a lump sum to be disbursed as the recipient na-
tion deems best.23
19. Approximate percentages of awards paid under the International Claims
Settlement Act programs have varied. The percentages include the following:
Yugoslavia, 91 percent (1st program), 36.1 percent (2nd program); Panama,
90 percent; Poland, 36 percent (estimated); Bulgaria, $1,000 plus 69.71 per-
cent; Hungary, $1,000 plus 1.5 percent; Rumania, $1,000 plus 37.84 percent;
Italy, 100 percent plus interest; Soviet Union, 8.5 percent; Czechoslovakia,
$1,000 plus 5.30 percent. 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 33-35.
20. Some use of mixed commissions ensued, however, such as the American-
Italian Conciliation Commission, evolving from the Treaty of Peace with Italy
in 1947. This Commission was created to resolve disputes regarding property in
Italy claimed by United States nationals. When the two national representa-
tives disagreed, a third party neutral nation was added to resolve the issue.
21. LILLICH, CLAIMS ADJUDICATION 11.
22. The experience of Peru in rejecting at various times prior to 1968 the
1924 international arbitration of the La Brea y Parifias oil field controversy,
clearly illustrates not only the reason for current reluctance to utilize arbitration,
but the more serious possibility that arbitration, if accepted, may subsequently
be rejected as a political reaction to nationalism. See Summers, Arbitration and
Latin America, 3 CALIF. WEST. INT'L L.J. 1 (1972).
23. LILLICH, CLAIMS ADJUDICATION 14. Were two similar claimants to
plead their cases before a mixed commission, one of whom had unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain compensation before the local courts of the expropriating
nation, the commission member from that nation might be hesitant in granting
1973]
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This preference found recognition in the United States in
the formation of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
Upon this Commission devolved the responsibility for adjudicat-
ing the claims of United States nationals against the government
of Cuba.
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CUBAN CLAIMS ACT
At the close of 1960 it was apparent that the direction to-
ward total nationalization which the Government of Cuba had
taken would result in an immense number of United States claims.
The situation was further complicated by the doubtfulness of any
reconciliation of the political differences between Cuba and the
United States in the foreseeable future. Consequently, although
some procedures through the Department of State for receiving
claims were available, the prospect of an early and successful res-
olution of the claims was minimal.2 4  The magnitude and politics
of the situation strongly suggested some form of pre-adjudication.
Additionally, while the witnesses were available and claims were
fresh, documentation and adjudication of the claims would pro-
vide some basis for future distributions of any lump sum settle-
ment. A further beneficial aspect of the lump sum settlement
form was that the Cuban Government would be precluded from
paying only those claimants which it needed for future dealings.
Cuba might still, of course, be required to make private arrange-
ments with a company with which it desired to resume business,
including perhaps the payment of whatever portion of the com-
pany's claim remained unsettled. However, a lump sum settle-
ment agreed to between the governments would be distributed
pro rata among all the granted claims, not those selected by
Cuba.
The framework of the FCSC was available and it was pre-
dictable that the Commission would be used for the Cuban claims.
Members of Congress, aware that the pre-adjudication might never
achieve its ultimate goal, settlement of the claims, nevertheless
appeared in favor of an early adjudication utilizing available or-
ganizations,25 and, in 1964, the Cuban Claims Act was passed,
the claim solely because of the possible offense to the jurist of his nation whodenied the claim on entirely distinct and inapplicable grounds. Brazil, in a
settlement of a dispute during the 1840's with the United States, ultimately
agreed to pay a lump sum to avoid the problems associated with the litigation of
claims within Brazil, and the undesirable prospect of relitigation of claims by a
mixed claims commission, a practice unappealing to the judiciary within Brazil.24. 1ILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARA-
TION AND PRESENTATION 93-94 (1962).
25. Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and the Cuban Claims
Program, I INT'L LAwYER 81, 82 (1966).
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amending the international Claims Settlement Act of 1949 by au-
thorizing the FCSC to determine claims of nationals of the United
States against the Cuban government.26  The Act clearly denoted
its adjudicatory rather than compensatory nature, stating "this ti-
tle shall not be construed as authorizing an appropriation or as
any intention to authorize an appropriation for the purpose of
paying such claims."27
The Cuban Claims Act, with the earlier created FCSC, pro-
vided the necessary organizational structure to commence the work
of hearing and deciding claims arising from the Cuban expro-
priation. A brief look at the FCSC and the Cuban Claims Act
structures is useful before considering specific claims.
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
The FCSC is a three member body whose members are ap-
pointed for staggered terms of three years by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. 8 Since the Commission's
function is, as the Supreme Court has stated, intrinsically judi-
cial, rather than regulatory, its functions could have been per-
formed by either the United States Court of Claims or one of the
District Courts.29 The benefit of the Commission, however, lies
in its ability to gain expertise in the narrow area, of adjudication
of foreign claims, a sphere in which evidence of the form usually
present in a legal controversy is likely to be unavailable. Further-
more, since the claims adjudicated in any one program will pre-
dictably have to share on a pro rata basis a lump sum settlement
amounting to a small fraction of the total, it is sound policy to
have those claims adjudicated by a single body, rather than a
variety of Federal District Courts. To place the entire workload
of the Commission upon a single District Court or the Court of
Claims, contrastingly, would add a workload which would un-
fairly tax the ability of that court to continue its traditional work,
26. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643-43k (Supp. 1970). While it was apparent that the
claims would be sizable, it was not predicted that they would reach the nearly
$2 billion finally granted. President Johnson stated, upon signing the Act into
law, that:
The Castro regime has expropriated over $1 billion worth of property
of United States nationals in total disregard for their rights. These
unlawful seizures violated every standard by which the nations of the
free world conduct their affairs ...
This bill will provide for the adjudication of these claims of
American nationals. I have signed it because of the importance of
making such a permanent record while evidence and witnesses are
still available. 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 674 (1964).
27. 78 Stat. 1110 (1964).
28. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2001(d) (1970).
29. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355 (1958).
19731
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
much less develop the new skills required to adjudicate the for-
eign claims.
The enabling statute prescribes that the Commission may es-
tablish its own rules and regulations,"° and it has adopted a set
of basic guidelines for the presentation of claims."' While the
Commission has a judicial function, its organization and task ne-
cessitate deviations from more traditional judicial procedures. The
adjudication of claims pertaining to acts occurring in a foreign
nation raises obvious problems of proof. When hostilities persist
between that nation and the United States, the difficulties are
compounded. A past Chairman of the Commission has indi-
cated that "[t]he Commission is not unaware of the fact that
many claims are difficult to substantiate . . . [Ilt . . . attempts
to assist claimants in securing necessary documentation.""2  The
documentation most often needed, however, is that left behind in
Cuba by claimants and beyond the reach of the Commission.
The atmosphere of assistance which prevails in the Commission
has been criticized as the Commission may too easily become a
mere conduit for the applicant's view of his claim, which is ac-
cepted without serious challenge for possible later settlement."3
While the Commission procedures provide for the appointment of
counsel to represent the public interest, 84 there is little evidence
of any serious utilization of this non-mandatory provision.
The filing period was initially November 1, 1965, to May 1,
1967. The program was scheduled to be completed by May 1,
1970. Budget reductions, with a consequent decline in the num-
ber of the Commission's staff, resulted in a Commission request to
extend the period. Congress complied and set the completion
date for July 6, 1972.15 Although the terminal filing date re-
mained May 1, 1967, the Commission continued to accept claims
"so long as the consideration thereof does not impede the de-
termination of those claims which were timely filed."8 6  Death
and disability claims could be filed after the final filing date, if
within six months of the date the claim arose.
30. 22 U.S.C. § 1622(c) (1970).
31. FCSC Regs., 45 C.F.R. H9 500.1-80.8 (1972).
32. Re, supra note 11 at 1091. Under the Polish Claims Program and theGeneral War Claims Program the Commission maintained offices in Warsaw andMunich, respectively, to assist in the collection of needed data. 21 FCSCSEMIANN. REP. 10, 15 [July-Dec. 1964]. This has obviously been impossible in
the case of Cuba.
33. See LILLICH, CLAIMS ADJUDICATION 51-52.
34. FCSC Regs., 45 C.F.R. § 531.6(c) (1972).
35. International Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643i (1970).
36. Claim of John Korenda, 1971 FCSC ANN. ReP. 36, 37. The Commis-
sion has certified all late filed claims which it granted separately to the Secre-
tary of State.
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The claims are filed on an official form," supported, where
possible, by exhibits and documents."' An FCSC staff attorney
then examines and develops each filed claim. After the claim is
receive and reviewed, the Commission issues a proposed deci-
sion,39 unless it has ordered a hearing on its own motion.
4
" If
the claimant objects to the proposed dcision, he may file his ob-
jections and, if he desires, request an oral hearing.4' FCSC ex-
perience indicates that the oral hearings have indeed been an im-
portant part of the claims procedures, particularly in the Commis-
sion's adoption of capitalization multipliers in establishing a going
concern value.42
The final decisions of the Commission, either the proposed
decisions without opposition or the Commission's final conclu-
sions after objections from the claimant, are usually certified to
the Secretary of the Treasury for payment under whatever settle-
ment agreement may be negotiated.4" In the case of Cuba, how-
ever, the Commission certifies to the Secretary of State the adju-
dicated amount."
The decisions of the Commission bear interest at the rate of
6% from the established date of taking. Title V has no provision
for interest, but the Commission has stated that the Act's man-
date determining the loss "in accordance with applicable substan-
tive law, including international law,"'45 when read in conjunction
with earlier provisions of the International Claims Settlement Act
may be interpreted as allowing interest. 4" The Commission fur-
ther stated that interest on national claims was indeed recognized
under international law.47  The amount of interest, which had
37. Form 666 for claims against the Government of Cuba. FCSC Regs.,
45 C.F.R. § 531.2(e) (1972).
38. Id. at § 531.3.
39. Id. at § 531.5(b).
40. id. at § 531.5(a).
41. Id. at 531.5(e). Other claimants may additionally file objections to a
proposed decision since their share of whatever fund is ultimately made available
may be affected by each decision of the Commission. Re, supra note 11 at 1092.
42. The Commission's increasing acceptance of multipliers is discussed in de-
tail in the text accompanying note 158, et seq., infra.
43. 22 U.S.C. § 1641g (1970).
44. 22 U.S.C. § 1643f(a) (1970). The decision is not subject to review.
22 U.S.C. § 1623(h) (1970). For a consideration of judicial review of the
FCSC's rulings, see Lillich, Judicial Review and the FCSC, 15 A. L. REv. 72
(1963). See also DeVegvar v. Gillilland, 228 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 994 (1956). While appeal is precluded, a claim may be re-
opened where new evidence is discovered. FCSC Regs., 45 C.F.R. § 531.5(1)
(1972). See Claim of Howard E. Holtzman, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 41.
45. Claim of American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 24 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 49
[July-Dec. 1966].
46. See id. at 51.
47. Id. citing 6 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1029 (1906);
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varied in previous claims programs, was set at 6% for Cuban
claims as "appropriate, equitable and just . . . under all the cir-
cumstances. ''48
DECISIONS UNDER THE CUBAN CLAIMS ACT
Property
The FCSC is granted authority under the Cuban Claims Act
to adjudicate claims in two broad classes:
[for losses] arising since January 1, 1959 ...out of nation-
alization, expropriation, intervention, or other takings of, or
special measures directed against, property of nationals of
the United States, and claims for disability or death of na-
tionals of the United States arising out of violation of inter-
national law by the Government of Cuba.49
The category which has accounted for the vast bulk of claims
filed to date is the former, claims arising from nationalization, ex-
propriation, intervention and other takings of property. Defini-
tional provisions of the Act include debts within the meaning of
property:
[debts] owed by the Government of Cuba or . ..by enter-
prises which have been nationalized, expropriated, intervened,
or taken by the Government of Cuba ... and debts which
are a charge on property which has been nationalized,
expropriated, intervened, or taken by the Government of
Cuba ... 50
Both the debt claims allowed under the above interpretation of
property and the claims due to disability or death were new to
FCSC programs."'
The breadth of the interpretative concept of property is illus-
trated by several decisions of the Commission. Quite obviously,
tangible real and personal property interests are included, as well
as such substantial interests in property as leases. As might be
expected, the less tangible the interest, the greater reluctance to
allow the claim. The Commission has often been liberal in itsinterpretation of property. In the claim of Wallace Tabor andCatherine Tabor,"' the Commission allowed a claim for real prop-
C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 203-04
(1928).
48. Id. at 52.
49. 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
50. 22 U.S.C. § 1643a(3) (1970).51. Professor Lillich suggests that these added classifications align UnitedStates claims procedure with that of the United Kingdom and Europe. Lillich,The Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 51 A.B.A.J. 445, 447 (1965). See also LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POST WAR BRITISH PRACTICE 76 (1967).
52. 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 53 [July-Dec. 1966].
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erty where title had not been registered nor had the full purchase
price been paid. The decision was based on an interpretation of
Cuban real property law that a sale is considered consummated
and binding on the parties even in the absence of delivery and
payment of the purchase price.58 Real property has generally
presented little interpretative difficulty for the Commission. 4 The
Commission has found a more difficult task in the area of per-
sonal property. Tangible belongings create problems of proof
of existence and valuation, rather than issues of whether they
constitute property. 5
Merchandise which was shipped to Cuba but not paid for
is clearly property. 6 The Commission has additionally allowed
costs of freight, shipping and insurance where they were part of
the original invoice submitted with the goods.5 7  In the Claim of
Pilgrim Plastics Corp.,"s where the property shipped to Cuba was
productive, i.e., a mold for manufacturing plastic heels, the Com-
mission allowed both the contractual amount owed for the ma-
chinery and royalty payments for the nearly ten year balance of
the contract period after the determined date of nationalization.
All royalties had become due in the Pilgrim claim by the time of
the decision. Royalty payments had been authorized earlier in
53. Id. at 55, citing J. LANZAS, STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CUBA IN MATTERS
AFFECTING BUSINESS 78 (2d ed. 1958).
54. See 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 55. Where the property is subject to a
life estate interest of a third party, the Commission has used mortality tables and
the Treasury Department's prevailing interest rate for the collection of gift and
estate taxes to determine the amount by which the claim should be reduced.
Claim of Richard Franchi Alfaro and Anna Alfaro, 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 71.
55. Household belongings left in Cuba and confiscated by the Cuban Govern-
ment have been the subject of valid claims. The main concern of the Commis-
sion is to obtain an accurate listing of the property and an estimate of replace-
ment cost. At best the Commission has been able to scrutinize the list to deter-
mine whether it appears to be reasonable for the claimant's income and status and
then adjust individual items which may appear to be improperly valued. See
generally Claim of Jack Moss, 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 52 [July-Dec. 19661
(detailed personal property list accepted); Claim of Richard G. Milk and Juliet
C. Milk, 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 63 (detailed personal property list accepted
with single change, reducing value of a freezer; additional reduction made for
employer reimbursement of part of property loss); Claim of Linden Stanley
Blue, 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 30 (aircraft valuation, less insurance settlement, and
list of personal property accepted); Claim of Estrella Vaughn, 1971 FCSC ANN.
REP. 76 (furniture, fixtures and tools accepted; five year old automobile claim
reduced from $2,500 to $625 and .$23,546 claim for "Old Cuban Currency" de-
nied for lack of substantiating evidence).
56. The burden of proving the debt for merchandise shipped is clearly on the
claimant, including the production of appropriate invoices. Claim of Steel Heddle
Manufacturing Co., 25 FCSC SEmIANN. REP. 58 [July-Dec. 1966]( claim denied for
failure to provide adequate documentation).
57. Claim of Schwarzenbach Huber Co., 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 58
[July-Dec. 1966].
58. 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 61.
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the Claim of Jantzen, Inc., 9 but were not claimed in that case for
the full, unexpired contract term, which would have run for
three years after the expropriation. In a third royalty case, the
Claim of Schiaparelli, Inc.,60 the claimant, as in the Pilgrim claim,
waited until the expiration of the contract period to file its claim
and the Commission allowed royalty for the entire contract pe-
riod. 6' The results suggest that the claimant in Jantzen should
have requested royalties to the expiration date of the contract,
August, 1963, rather than to October, 1960. The latter date
was apparently the last date of any documentation of net sales of
the Cuban licensee. The difficulty in Jantzen was that the roy-
alties determined by sales were impossible to predict for the bal-
ance of the contract, although some estimate based on averaging
the completed years might have been applied.
Debts owed United States nationals and property designated
by the Act may take several forms. In the Claim of Kramer,
Marx, Greenlee and Backus,"2 the court allowed a claim by a law
firm for legal services rendered to nationalized Cuban clients.
In the Kramer claim the debt was owed by Cuban entities. Where
the debt is owed by a United States corporation which qualifies
as a national under the Act,63 however, the claim will only be al-
lowed when the debt is a charge on property which has been
taken by the Government of Cuba. 4
A variety of miscellaneous claims have been presented to
the Commission. A claim based upon a judgment against the
Government of Cuba rendered in a Pennsylvania court was held
to be proper under the Act, 65 as were vested retirement benefits
owing from the Government of Cuba,66 damages sustained dur-
ing wrongful detention to personal property illegally detained in
59. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 66.
60. 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 55.
61. There was, however, only a month and a half remaining on the three
year contract at the time of nationalization.
62. 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 62 [July-Dec. 1966]. In the Claim of JohnKorenda, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 36, the FCSC allowed a claim based on a debt
acknowledged by the Cuban Government for the accidental killing of a UnitedStates tourist in March, 1957, during a raid on the Presidential Palace, one of the
more noteworthy, although poorly executed and unsuccessful challenges to Presi-
dent Batista's rule before Castro came to power.
63. 22 U.S.C. § 1643a(1) (1970).
64. 22 U.S.C. § 1643d(a) (1970). See Claim of Anaconda American BrassCo., 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 60 (portion of claim denied-debt not shown to be
a charge on property); Claim of Ebasco Industries, Inc., 1969 FCSC ANN. RaP.
66 (portion of claim denied-not a charge on property).
65. Claim of James Keys, 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 75.66. Claim of A.M. Joy de Pardo, 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 71; Claim of
Estrella Vaughn, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 76.
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Cuba,"' and bond obligation of the Cuban Government.6 8
The Commission has rejected portions of claims representing
items for legal and other fees related to perfecting claims,69 ex-
penses incurred in moving property out of Cuba and opening
new offices,7" and the moving or resettlement of employees and
separation payments.7 1  The Commission has additionally gener-
ally rejected specific claims for goodwill, organizational expenses
and future profits as not compensable under the Act,72 although
these elements, as part of a going concern value, have been
recognized in later decision. Several of the rejected items,
such as relocation expenses of a business, are obviously incurred
because of the nationalization. They do not, however, meet a
property definition. The Act was not meant to allow recovery of
all costs which might flow reasonably from the nationalization,
but rather to determine the value of property directly affected by
the Cuban Government's actions.
Claims based on the second main classification, personal in-
juries or disability, come within the meaning of property only
when the claimant establishes that the injury or disability was
proximately caused by the Government of Cuba in violation of
international law.73 Consequently, in a case where the injury was
caused by incarceration for criminal acts not shown to be a viola-
tion of international law, the Commission rejected the claim as
failing to constitute property. 74
Standing
In addition to establishing that the subject of the claim is
property, the claimant bears the additional burden of establishing
67. Claim of Linden Stanley Blue, 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 30.
68. Claim of Clemens R. Maise, 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 68; Claim of Aetna
Insurance Co., 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 47.
69. Claim of Mary Pauline Seal, 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 57 (translation
fees); Claim of Linden Stanley Blue, 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 30 (legal fees).
Attorney's fees for attempting to recover property prior to utilizing FCSC pro-.
cedures have also been denied. Claims of Berlanti Construction Co., 1971 FCSC
ANN. REP. 83.
70. Claim of PPG Industries, Inc., 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 51.
71. Id., Claim of Cuban Electric Co., 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 74; Claim of
American Brands, Inc., 1970FCSC ANN. REP. 36.
72. See, e.g., Claims of Berlanti Construction Co., 1971 FCSC ANN. REP.*
83. Goodwill, organizational expenses, future profits and the general area of
corporate asset valuation are discussed in greater detail below. See text accom-
panying notes 102 et. seq., infra.
73. Proof of such violation is naturally difficult for the Commission to ob-
tain. For an interesting and successful attempt, see Claim of Jennie M. Fuller,
1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 53, 56-59.
74. Claim of Isabella Shamma, 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 49.
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his status as a national of the United States. The Act defines a
national of the United States as:
(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States,
or
(B) a corporation or other legal entity which is organized
under the laws of the United States, or of any State, the
District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
if natural persons who are citizens of the United States own,
directly or indirectly, 50 per centum or more of the out-
standing capital stock or other beneficial interest of such
corporation or entity. The term does not include aliens.75
The Commission is not a forum for the adjudication of
claims of Cubans who have been exiled to the United States.
The individual or corporation must have been a national of the
United States at the time of the taking. 6  Consequently, those
Cubans who fled to the United States subsequent to the taking
of their property cannot qualify even if they have since become
citizens. Those Cubans who fled before the date of nationaliza-
tion, knowing that their property would be taken, are unlikely to
have been able to establish citizenship prior to the actual taking.
Furthermore, their departure might well be held to have consti-
tuted an abandonment of the property, subjecting the property to
immediate confiscation by the Cuban government.
The status of the claimant as a national must be maintained
from the date of the taking to the date of filing.77  When a party
who satisfied the national status requirement died, a subsequent
75. 22 U.S.C. § 1643a(1) (1970).
76. The time of the taking has also caused some difficulty, essentially for
claims filed for takings occurring prior to January 1, 1959, the statutory date
beginning the period of expropriations to be covered by the Cuban Claims Act.
22 U.S.C. § 1643(b) (1970). In the Claim of Emilio J. Pasarell, 1967 FCSC
ANN. REP. 56, the Commission denied claimant's theory that he owned a mort-
gage interest dating from 1926, but partially unpaid. The Commission inter-
preted Cuban law to require foreclosure of mortgages within 20 years, citing J.
LANZAS, STATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF CUBA IN MATTERS AFFECTINO BUSINESS,
317 (2d ed. 1958). In another claim, the Commission held that the sale of par-
cels of real property at auction, between 1954 and 1958, for unpaid taxes was
neither an act of nationalization disguised as a tax sale nor could the claim be
accepted because the acts took place prior to January, 1959. Claim of Louis P.
Zink, 1967 FCSC ANN. REp. 65.
77. 22 U.S.C. § 1643c(a) (1970). Claim of Michael Vasti, 1967 FCSC ANN.
REP. 62 (claim denied because claimant assigned it prior to filing). See also
Claims of AOFC, Inc., 1971 FCSC ANN. REp. 70, 72 (interpreting section
504(a) and 505 of the Cuban Claims Act; Claim of Harry Mitgang and Anna
Mitgang, 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 66; Claim of John A. Stiehler, 1967 FCSC
ANN. REP. 70. United States citizens remaining in Cuba and known to the
Commission, had claims filed in their behalf. The Commission has attempted to
document such claims and has certified them when satisfied of their validity.
See Claim of Placido Navas Costa, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 42.
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claim filed by the decedent's mother, a citizen of Iceland, was
denied. 78  The Commission was lenient, however, in allowing a
claim in which it was impossible to determine the ownership of
bonds for a short period subsequent to the time of the national-
ization. The claimant, a United States national, filed his claim
for the bonds which he had purchased 13 days after the issuer's
property was nationalized. 79
The more difficult problem of standing involves corpora-
tions. As allowed by the Act quoted above, a claim may be pre-
sented individually by shareholders of a corporation only when
less than 50 per cent of the stock of the corporation is owned by
nationals.8 " Where 50 per cent or more of the stock is owned
by United States nationals, the corporation itself must file the
claim.8  The Commission has consequently denied a claim in
which a Delaware corporation was wholly owned by a Danish
corporation, none of whose shareholders were believed to be
United States nationals, 2 while it allowed the claim of a United
States corporation which was the parent of a wholly owned Pana-
manian corporation, which, in turn, was the sole owner of the
expropriated Cuban corporation. 3 When a corporation, other-
wise qualifying as a national, became defunct after the loss, the
Commission allowed a claim by the trustee for the benefit of non-
claimant shareholders and creditors, thus avoiding the necessity
78. Claim of Sigridur Einarsdottir, 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 45 [July-Dec.
1966]. Where the claim is filed by the national, however, the claimant's death
does not prevent a non-national heir from pursuing the adjudication of the claim.
Claim of Ampar Rodriguez, 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 69. See also Claim of the
Florida Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 67 (claim denied for
inability of United States national administrator to establish United States na-
tionality of beneficial owner of property); accord, Claim of Efrim Golodetz,
1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 60.
79. Claim of Samuel J. Wikler, 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 47. The Commission
utilized information submitted by the trustee on the bonds, which evidenced that
the bonds had almost entirely been purchased and owned by persons with United
States addresses. The Commission drew an inference that the bonds were con-
tinually owned by nationals of the United States, following the practice used by
the Commission in the Soviet Claims Program. Id. at 49, citing Claim of Theo-
dore Francis Green, 10 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 205 [Jan.-June 1959].
80. See text accompanying note 62 supra. See Claim of Ruth Anna Has-
kew, 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 31 (claim allowed where corporation not a United
States national); Claim of Efrim Golodetz, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 60.
81. Claim of Mary F. Sonnenberg, 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 48 [July-Dec.
1966] (individual claim denied where the corporation stipulated that more than
50 percent of the stock was owned by United States nationals).
82. Claim of F.L. Smith & Co., 25 FCSC SEMIkNN. REP. 44 [July-Dec.
19661.
83. Claim of Avon Products, Inc., 1967 FCSC ANNm. REP. 35. The indirect
ownership intent of the United States corporation in the Avon claims required
only 25 percent or more ownership to qualify the corporation as a national.
22 U.S.C. § 1643d(c) (1970). See also Claim of United Merchants & Manu-
facturers, Inc., 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 52.
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of numerous individual claims by minority shareholders. 4  The
members or trustees of a nonstock corporation, when 50 per cent
or more of its members qualify as nationals, may bring a claim on
behalf of the corporation. 5
Although no "foreign" owners were involved, a claim for the
loss due to the expropriation of a Cuban corporation wholly
owned by the United States government was denied by the Com-
mission."' The United States government owned a large invest-
ment in the Cuban Nickel Company located at Moa Bay. 7 While
the International Claims Settlement Act of 1945 provided that its
jurisdiction was to determine "claims of the Government of the
United States and of nationals of the United States,"8 8 the addi-
tion of Title V to the Act clearly evidenced a specific Congres-
sional intent to exclude claims by the United States Government
for expropriation by the Government of Cuba. 9
Taking
In addition to the claimant's burden of proving that he quali-
fies as a national and owned property in Cuba on January 1,
1959, the proof of a "taking" has created a few hurdles. Be-
cause of the lack of more than fringe communications between
Cuba and the United States during the two years of intensive na-
tionalization, the Commission has of necessity established certain
accepted dates applicable to various categories of property. While
a number of claims have been supported by evidence of cited
Cuban legislation or resolutions taking over the claimant's prop-
erty specifically, other claims have relied upon several of the
broader Cuban laws, which ultimately nationalized all remaining
84. Claim of Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 44.
85. Claim of Independence Foundation, 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 38.
86. Claims of the United States of America, 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 50.
87. Id.
88. 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1970).
89. The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Repre-
sentatives stated that "U.S. government claims against Cuba are not governed by
this Act and will be handled separately from the U.S. private claims to adjudi-
cated under the legislation." H.R. REP. No. 706, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
Presumably the United States would not have expected to have its claims paid in
full prior to applying a lump sum settlement to other private claims under the
act, a practice certain to cause justifiable objection, particularly for those gov-
ernmental activities commercial in nature, including the claim rejected by the
Commission. Since any ultimate lump-sum settlement will be the result of gov-
ernmental negotiations, the United States Government would appear to be better
off not utilizing the Cuban Claims Act, thereby allowing it to negotiate both a
lump-sum settlement to be applied to claims adjudicated under the Act, and a
separate settlement of governmental claims, albeit commercial in nature. Such a
settlement would be no less subject to objections than the priority commented
upon above.
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United States property on the Island. 0 The final nationalization
acts have undoubtedly simplified the task of the Commission by
the rather clear result that no foreign private property remains
in Cuba-allowing the conclusion that property proven to have
been owned at the required time had in fact been taken. Such
encompassing Cuban legislation as Law 568, °1 precluding trans-
fers to all creditors abroad as well as within Cuba, has provided
a useful base to ease the proof of the taking. When there is an
added resolution by the government of Cuba specifically inter-
vening the claimant, the combination of the two acts is even
greater justification for finding a taking to have occurred.
Where a claimant company has been able to establish both
dates of intervention and nationalization, the Commission has
dated the taking from the former, since the claimant was effec-
tively deprived of the full use of his property as of the date of
intervention, rather than the date of nationalization. 2 Proof of
intervention alone, without the claimant's introduction of evidence
of a further confiscatory act, should be sufficient to establish a
taking, in light of the fact that all United States property was
eventually taken. The Commission has even allowed a claim on
the basis of a constructive taking where the claimant could find
no decree, law or resolution specifically referring to his property
in the Cuban Official Gazette." The decision was based on the
general nationalization of the shipping industry, the seriatim Cu-
ban passage of laws which "reinforced the control which the Gov-
ernment of Cuba already exercised," and the restrictions on cur-
rency flow.94
The proof of the taking of real property has often been
based on the Cuban Law of Urban Reform, passed in October,
196 0 .1 This law, affecting residential, commercial, industrial and
90. Law 851, July 6, 1960, Gaceta Oficial, July 6, 1960, implementing resolu-
tions nationalizing remaining United States corporations. See Claim of West
Indies Sugar Corp., 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 78, relying generally on Resolution
No. 1 of August 6, 1960. Several claims have relied on the broad nationaliza-
tion laws with the Commission accepting the claim without actual knowledge of
physical possession of the property by the government of Cuba. The Act indeed
does not make physical possession of the property by the expropriating nation a
condition of allowing a claim; it rather reflects the view that the claimant need
only prove that he was deprived of the use of his property. See the Claim of
Perkins Marine Lamp and Hardware Corp., 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 42 (court
accepted notice of Law 1076 of Dec. 5, 1962, Official Gazette, which nationalized
all private enterprise engaged in clothing, weaving, and hardware business, as
satisfying the proof of a "taking" requirement).
91. Law 568, 29 Sept. 1959, Gaceta Official, 29 Sept. 1959.
92. Claim of American Brands, Inc., 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 36.
93. Claim of Garcia & Diaz, Inc., 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 30.
94. Id. at 32.
95. 14 Oct., 1960, Gaceta Oficial, Edicion Extraordinaria, 14 Oct. 1960.
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business office properties, terminated leases with private owners,
ordered rents to be paid to the government and essentially sealed
up many properties. The Commission has generally accepted this
Law as resulting in the total takeover of subject properties, with-
out need of convincing substantiating evidence. 6
Obligations owing from banks in particular, and other debt-
ors in general, have been the subject of numerous claims. The
Commission decided that the series of Cuban laws relating to
monetary reform meant that debts could not be paid to creditors
outside Cuba.97  The Commission, noting the principle expressed
by Wortley that a simple depreciation of currency or restrictions
regarding transfer would not necessarily be a violation of inter-
national law, held that the Government of Cuba had not legiti-
mately exercised its authority to regulate foreign exchange, but
had confiscated the funds in violation of international law."
The Commission, while liberal in determining whether a tak-
ing has occurred, has evidenced a limit to its leniency in rejecting
the Cuban "Revolution" itself as proof of a taking. In the Claim
of the Estate of Edward Borowy, Deceased,99 the Commission
denied a claim for a package of jewelry which had allegedly been
placed in a private depository in Cuba. Concerned that the pack-
age was not in a bank, and therefore subject to the laws of the
government of Cuba, the Commission stated, "There is no evi-
dence of record that this property has been taken by the Govern-
ment of Cuba nor has any Cuban law been cited as affecting this
property."' 100 It seems reasonable to assume that the Commis-
sion was not so much saying that property remained in Cuba
which was still privately owned by non-deprived United States
nationals, but rather felt that small and valuable items which
could possibly be removed from the Country clandestinely should
be shown to have actually come into the custody of the Govern-
ment of Cuba before a claim is allowed.
96. Claim of Jack Moss, 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 52 [July-Dec. 1966](actual date of taking held to be three months later, when Cuban official sealed
claimant's vacated apartment); Claim of Henry Lewis Slade, 1967 FCSC ANN.
REP. 39; Claim of Placido Navas Costa, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 42; Claim of
Estrella Vaughn, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 76.
97. See, e.g., Claim of Floyd W. Auld, 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 55 [July-Dec.
1966].
98. 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 58, 60 [July-Dec. 1966], citing B. WORTLEY,
EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (1959). Accord, Claim of
Etna Pozzolana Corp., 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 46.
99. 25 FCSC SEMIANN. REP. 45 [July-Dec. 1966].
100. Id. See also Claim of Estrella Vaughn, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 76,
where Commission denied unsupported claim for $23,546 of "Old Cuban cur-
rency."
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PROPERTY AND BUSINESS VALUATION
While issues of defining "property," "national" and a "tak-
ing" have given rise to some difficulties, clearly the most contro-
versial and yet unrefined area is that of determining the value
of nationalized property. 101
The Cuban Claims Act requires the Commission, in deter-
mining value of nationalized property, to
take into account the basis of valuation most appropriate to
the property and equitable to the claimant, including but not
limited to (i) fair market value, (ii) book value, (iii) going
concern value, or (iv) cost of replacement. 10 2
The approach to valuation differs depending on the nature
of the claimant. The claims basically fit into one of two cate-
gories. In the first category, specific, identifiable property,
whether real or personal, is the subject of the claim. Valuation
depends on the Commission's satisfaction with the description of
the property and the utilization of some means of identifying its
worth. With some variations, the Commission has essentially at-
tempted to determine a market value whether the item be a parcel
of land or a refrigerator. There are, of course, some problems
in valuation of these items, and several claims will be discussed
below to illustrate the Commission's approach to this type of val-
uation.
Real Property
The Commission uses similar appraisal methods whether real
property interests were owned by individuals or corporations.
The purchase price of property is usually the starting point for
consideration. Higher valuations appear as increases from the
original price at which the land was purchased. When a claimant
101. See generally THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAw (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
102. 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a) (1970). Prior implementing legislation of na-
tional claims commissions, with the exception of the Czechoslovakian Claims
Act of 1958, omitted any reference to methods of property valuation. The Com-
mission adopted the rather broad definition of the "value" of the property at the
time of the loss, applying concepts of market value. While the Commission ac-
cepted the introduction of proof of market value under a variety of standards, the
Cuban Claims Act codified this willingness to admit proof based upon theories of
book value, going concern value, cost of replacement, as well as fair market value.
See LILLICH, THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY BY THE FEDERAL CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 96-100 (R. Lillich ed. 1972). For legislative history regard-
ing the adoption of alternative valuation methods, see Hearings on Claims of
U.S. Nationals Against the Government of Cuba Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
American Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
53 (1964).
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believes the value of his land based on purchase price is too low,
he may seek appraisal services to establish a more realistic market
value. In the absence of acceptable additional evidence, the Com-
mission has little alternative but to rely upon book value as the
best measure of asset valuation. Where the land was purchased
shortly before the date of nationalization, the book value is likely
to be the acceptable valuation. 03
The use of appraisers has raised the serious obstacle of re-
taining persons with a legitimate knowledge of real estate values
in Cuba at the time of the Revolution. The Commission has jus-
tifiably been concerned with the qualifications of proferred ap-
praisers. The reported claims decisions evidence the successful
retention by a number of claimants of one appraiser, Luis Para-jon. In the Claim of Berwind Corp.,'" the Commission accepted
Sr. Parajon's appraisal of land which increased the valuation$600,271.69 over the book value. 105 Successive claimants uti-
lized, with seemingly consistent advantage, Sr. Parajon's exper-
tise to increase book value figures.' Sr. Parajon had long ex-
perience in Cuba as an appraiser of real estate, including sugar
properties. The Commission has been less reliant upon those
persons used as appraisers who were exiled from Cuba but who
were not formerly professional appraisers. That reluctance ex-
tends to accepting former Cuban lawyers as appraisers.'0 7
Productive land adds an additional dimension to valuation,
correctly recognized by the FCSC. The Commission accepted
an appraisal of sugar cane fields and grazing lands based on
yield in the Claim of Ruth Anna Haskaw.08
103. Claim of Louis Suskin, Dec. No. CU-3370 (Jan. 14, 1969). Accord,Claim of Amparo Rodriguez, 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 31, where the property waspurchased about two weeks prior to its nationalization, presumably at the adjudi-
cated value.
104. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 28.
105. For a comment by the attorney for Berwind regarding Sr. Parajon's
expertise, see Laylin, Panel Discussion, The Taking of Property: Evaluation ofDamages, 62 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 35 (1968). The annual report
of the FCSC suggests a valuation increase of $600,311.69, noted as an errorfrom the actual decision in FRIEDBERG & LOCKWOOD, THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
IN CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA, THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 117, note 19 at 120 (R. Lillich ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
FRIEDBERG].
106. Claim of Ruth Anna Haskew, 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 31; Claim of
United Fruit Sugar Corp., 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 42.107. See Claim of Richard Franchi Alfaro and Anna Alfaro, 1967 FCSC ANN.
REP. 71.
108. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 31, 37. Also the result of an appraisal of Sr.Parajon. The same method of appraisal was later used by the Commission in
other sugar and grazing land valuations. See Claim of Albert E. Wadsworth,
Dec. No. CU-3581 (May 2, 1969).
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As indicated above, purchase price is a useful valuation cri-
terion where the purchase was consummated near the time of ex-
propriation. °9 Purchase price was also the accepted valuation
method in the Claim of Mary Paulin Seal,110 where the individual
claimant had completed a four year installment purchase plan
on a lot twenty-one months prior to its nationalization, in the
Claim of Wallace Tabor and Catherine Tabor,"' where claimants
had suspended the last few payments when nationalization seemed
imminent, and in the Claim of Ebasco Industries, Inc.,1 2 where
the property had been purchased only five and one-half years be-
fore nationalization, although not on an installment basis.
Less persuasive to the Commission, but allowed when con-
vincingly documented, are offers to purchase which support a
claimant's assertion that the real property value is higher than
book value or purchase price. In the Claim of International Har-
vester Co.,"' the Commission accepted a valuation of certain real
property of $173,000, approximately that offered for the prop-
erty as documented by company correspondence. The Commis-
sion additionally allowed a substantially larger than book value
claim for other real property owned by the same claimant, al-
though the decision does not indicate that any offer was made
on that property. Former Cuban employees had measured its
value, notwithstanding a book value which totaled only $187,-
099.71 for both of the parcels." 4
Where the land of a claimant was purchased long before the
nationalization, and there are no recent documented offers nor
available professional appraisals, the Commission expectedly has
greater difficulty deviating from a purchase price/book value so-
109. See text accompanying note 103 supra. Claim of Louis Suskin, Dec.
No. CU-3370 (Jan. 14, 1969).
110. 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 57 (claimant did not request a higher valuation).
One cannot help but suspect that for small parcels of land the Commission will
not require the detailed proof required for commercial properties. Sympathy for
individual claimants who have lost all of their belongings is understandable.
Furthermore, the reduction of a claim by a few thousand dollars will have little
effect on the ultimate outcome. If there ever is a lump sum settlement, the
claimants will be fortunate to receive ten percent of their claim. Consequently,
the reduction of a few thousand dollars may mean only a few hundred at payment
time. For a claim determined toward the end of the program, where total claims
had reached about $2 billion, with little question to valuation of property in
which the claimants owned partial interests, see Claim of Placido Navas Costa,
1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 42.
111. 25 FCSC SEMIAmNN. REP. 53 [July-Dec. 1966] (claimants did not request
a higher valuation).
112. 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 66.
113. 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 71. The company had additionally authorized
its employees to sell the property for slightly more than the offered amount and
the final allowed claims value.
114. Id. at 73, 74.
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lution. However, other valuation methods may help the claimant
to achieve a fair valuation. In the Claim of Henry Lewis Slade,"5
the Commission accepted company valuations endorsed by an In-
ternal Revenue Service loss allowance. Further instances of the
Commission's partial reliance on a claimant's valuation with an
external organization were the Claim of Richard Franchi Alfaro
and Anna Alfaro,1 6 where the accepted value was that given by
the claimant for posting to the Registration Books in Havana,
and the Claim of Jennie M. Fuller, 17 where the claimant had filed
an inventory, with fair market values, with the National Institute
of Agrarian Reform, the revolutionary organization set up to ad-
minister the land reform program.
Improvements to land increase the complexity of valuations,
although the general principles expressed above apply. Where
buildings have been constructed, a claim by an individual will in-
clude the value added to the land in its undeveloped state. Re-
cent purchase prices of similar properties, or firm offers to pur-
chase the property in question, are persuasive. Less impressive,
but in some cases sufficient, proof would be IRS loss allowances
or Registration Book values as in the Slade and Alfaro claims men-
tioned above."' 8 Personal residences may create greater valuation
problems than business properties. A former Commissioner of
the FCSC has indicated that, in the absence of appraisal, acquisi-
tion costs, or sales of comparable residential buildings, the Com-
mission will utilize cost of construction rather than replacement
cost." 9 Where the improved land is part of a claim by a corpo-
ration, however, the Commission will consider its productive
value, as it has in the cases dealing with sugar and grazing lands.' 20
Thus, a going concern value may be the best valuation method
for productive land, whether the developed land is appraised sep-
115. 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 39. The claimant stated that his property was
worth $26,000, but he had carried it on his corporate books at $44,000 since its
purchase in 1929 ($12,000 purchase price, $32,000 in improvements), with de-
preciation at $24,800. The balance, or $19,200 was allowed by the Internal
Revenue Service and also accepted by the Commission. There had been recent,
and rejected, offers to buy about two-thirds of the property for $8,500, which the
Commission did not seem to believe were significant. The decision is actually
close to one based on book value, since the improvements were legitimate entries
which increased the book value above the purchase price, subject to periodic
depreciation.
116. 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 71.
117. 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 53. The fair market value so listed, higher than
assessed values, nevertheless had substantial documented support. Id. at 55.
118. See notes 115 and 116 supra.
119. Freidberg at 122. Improvements made to a leasehold interest have also
been valued at cost, less depreciation. Claim of PPG Industries, Inc., 1970
FCSC ANN. REP. 51, 53.
120. See text accompanying and note 108 supra.
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arately from other assets or is part of the total asset structure of a
corporation, particularly if, in conjunction with other asset in-
puts, the result is the adoption of a capitalization multiplier.
121
Extractive Industry Property
The problems attendant to valuing petroleum and mining
operations are compounded both because of the high initial risks
and costs and, in the case of Cuba, the lack of success of extrac-
tive industries in locating substantial petroleum or mineral de-
posits, with perhaps the exception of nickel and sulphur. 2 There
have been no significant petroleum discoveries in Cuba. Conse-
quently, the nationalization process resulted in the takeover of
companies which had highly questionable assets. Extraction ori-
ented companies which are in production have income state-
ments which allow valuation by capitalization. There is no ef-
fective method for determining a value to a company, however,
whose success has been solely in its consistency of drilling dry
wells. Adding the high cost of exploration and the corporate
propensity (and affirmation by accepted accounting principles) to
list exploration costs as assets, claims of non-productive com-
panies have expectedly provided the Commission with some mo-
ments of truly complex decision making.
One of the first reported FCSC decisions involving petro-
leum interests was the Claim of Felix Heyman. 2' The valuation
of several oil drilling and exploration companies was at issue, en-
tities whose not atypical experience in drilling led either to dry
wells or ones which at best could be described as "damp," but
which were certainly not of commercially productive levels. The
investment was nevertheless a legitimate venture; the entities pos-
sessed concession rights in substantial acreage. 2 4  The Commis-
sion's task was to consider an expenditure of $1,574,267.86 which
the corporation carried as an asset described as "unrecovered pro-
motional, exploratory and development costs.' 25  The value was
rejected by the Commission in that it was "not fairly indicative of
net disposable unit value,"' 26 preferring rather a book value with
adjustment to the assets. The Commission allowed $886,615.03
of the broad category above, however, limited to those elements
121. Where developed property is leased the rental income may be capitalized
to determine asset value. Claim of Sarkis K. Ayoob, Dec. No. CU-1989 (July
22, 1968).
122. See text accompanying and notes 128-30 infra.
123. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 51.
124. The concession rights either acquired or expected covered about 6.5 mil-
lion hectares, or 16 million acres. Id. at 53.
125. Id. at 54.
126. Id.
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of payments relating to the filing and transfer of claims; maps,
plans, and geological and other reports; exploration expenses and
tangible property such as machinery and equipment. While the
Commission did disallow such expenses as salaries, office rent
and travel costs as not properly constituting assets, the decision
evidences substantial acceptance of the intangible and speculative
value of a mining venture. What might be criticized is the Com-
mission's failure to realize the inverse relationship which the value
of mining stock would have as time transpired and the venture
evidenced a distinct lack of success in discovering productive de-
posits. The distinction which the Commission is apparently try-
ing to make in extractive industry claims is that those expenses
which could have been directly the progenitor of productive wells
should be allowed to retain some element of "asset" status, while
those which clearly could not have been transferred into accep-
table assets must be eliminated. The definition, as well as the Com-
mission's decision, is at best an attempt to give some value to a
legitimate industry so that those investors who are willing to risk
capital in a highly speculative venture may obtain some com-
pensation if nationalization occurs at an inappropriate stage in the
development of the venture.
The Commission has rejected market value of speculative
petroleum or mining securities where the actual prospects of the
company were poor. In the Claim of D.R. Wimberly,"' the
Commission rejected any valuation of stock on the basis of a
speculative and fluctuating market, which ranged from $.25 to$1.125 per share, and substituted instead a value of $.1198 per
share. The latter valuation was derived from the book value of
the company after deducting nearly two-thirds of a book value
asset designated "unrecovered promotional, exploratory and de-
velopment costs."
In contrast to the claims before the Commission where little
success had been achieved in discovering commercially produc-
tive oil or minerals, the Claim of Nicaro Nickel Company, evi-
dences an enterprise which had yet to commence full mining op-
erations at the time of nationalization, but convinced the FCSC
that it was entitled to nickel which was not likely to be depleted
for some time. The Commission first allowed a claim based on
a right to proven ore at a discounted value over a period from
1961 to 1979, but rejected claims for probable ore and possible
ore.128 However, the Commission, after oral hearing, reversed
its earlier position and allowed decreasing discounted net value
127. Dec. No. CU-3418 (Feb. 10, 1969).
128. Proposed Decision, Dec. No. CU-6247 (June 30, 1971).
[Vol. 13
FOREIGN CLAIMS
amounts for probable ore from 1979 to 1984 and possible ore
from 1985 to 1992.129 The expert witness, a geologist, con-
vinced the Commission that much of the probable ore was in fact
proven, and much of the possible ore was probable. The de-
cision represents another aspect of the more liberal approach
taken by the Commission during the later stages of hearings un-
der the Cuban Claims Act, paralleling its increasing openness to
going concern value methods of appraising commercial entities,
discussed at length below.
Where a claimant attempted to include as property the ex-
pectation of improved mining processes, however, the Commis-
sion was less amenable to the claim. In the Claim of Freeport
Sulphur Co., the claimant assigned valuations to several of its
mining concessions which had never been exploited. A mining
official attempted to support the claims by asserting that higher
metal prices and improved processing methods would render the
deposits commercially exploitable. The Commission denied the
entire claim for failing to establish any value to the mines on the
date of loss. 130
Personal Property
It is often difficult for individuals who have fled an ex-
propriating nation to reconstruct an accurate listing of their per-
sonal belongings. The Commission has been cognizant of this
problem and, utilizing retail catalogs and advertisements, it has
generally been liberal in allowing reasonable claimant estimates,
less depreciation.1 ' In the Claim of Richard G. Milk and Julian
C. Milk, the Commission accepted the stated total of $5,670.00
for personal belongings left in Cuba by comparing the claimants'
list with "similar items listed in material available to the Commis-
sion," with a minor deduction for an over-valued freezer.'" 2
Personal property of corporations is readily identifiable with
book value, less depreciation. The appreciation attributes of real
property are generally absent. Consequently, the Commission
has found little difficulty in determining value of corporate per-
129. 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 38.
130. 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 89.
131. Depreciation is not calculated for either works of art or antiques. Claim
of Sylvia Klein Telson, Dec. No. CU-1587 (March 16, 1970); Claim of Eleanor
L. Crosby, Dec. No. CU-4490 (March 16, 1970).
132. 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 63, 64. Accord, Claim of Jack Moss, 25 FCSC
Semiann. Rep. 52 [July-Dec. 19661, where the entire detailed list offered by the
claimant, totalling $6,229.00, was allowed. The Commission found the list to be
"fair and reasonable" after a consideration of the value given to each item, al-
though no reference was made to the Commission's use of comparison data.
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sonal property, rejecting requests based on cost or replacement,
as in the Claim of M & M Dredging & Construction Co.'88
Where business property has been fully depreciated but re-
mains productive a different valuation problem is presented. In
the Claim of IBM World Trade Corp.,8 4 the claimant had uti-
lized a rapid depreciation schedule for data processing rental ma-
chinery, which resulted in its possession of equipment producing
rental income but which had been completely depreciated. The
Commission lowered the depreciation rate for some machinery,
rejecting any value for machinery produced prior to 1948. While
the claimant did not so request, a valuation based on capitalizing
rental income derived from the machines might have been pref-
erable." 5
Business Valuation: The Going Concern
A piecemeal valuation of real or personal property may suf-
fice to provide a resolution of most claims. But it is the second
category that is the core of the valuation problem, and of far
greater complexity. That is the valuation of an operating busi-
ness. The Cuban nationalizations reached every form of busi-
ness entity and activity. It was not the case of one industry or
sector being expropriated, as has occurred in other developing
nations such as Mexico and Peru, but rather a total elimination
of private ownership of the means of production and distribution.
Consequently, included among the properties nationalized were
faling as well as prospering companies, companies engaged in
the production of capital goods as well as goods for consumption,
companies involved in a variety of distribution methods, utilities,
transportation industries and every other sector where private own-
ership had gained a foothold over the past half-century. Al-
though the first years of the Commission's experience with the
Cuban Claims Act suggest a hesitancy to vary from a strict book
value approach, with an occasional reevaluation of particular as-
sets, the Commission later adopted methodologies more in keep-
ing with the broader view of valuation desired by Congress and
expressed in the Act.
The essential difference in the concept of valuation between
the Cuban Claims Program and earlier FCSC programs is the
133. 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 28.
134. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 69.
135. Rental income would seemingly have been important to the valuation of
motion picture prints produced by United States companies and distributed by
nationalized Cuban businesses. The Commission has rejected using rental in-
come in decisions, however, based on the Commission's objection to valuations
based on projected earnings. The general area of valuation of motion picture
prints is not distinguished for its clarity. See Friedberg at 127-28.
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allowance of a going concern value, which introduces such diffi-
cult determinants as goodwill and loss of profits. The addition
of the going concern value category places an increased burden
on the Commission. Considering the probability that full pay-
ment of all claims will never be forthcoming, and that claimants
will have to accept pro rata amounts of whatever lump sum may
ultimately be agreed to, those claimant business entities which
are successful in including significant elements of goodwill and
future profits may profit at the expense of those claimants unable
to establish a going concern value or whose claims were proc-
essed prior to the Commission's acceptance of the going concern
concept. Supplemented by the difficulty of proof of claims be-
cause of the frequent absence of adequate records in many cases,
the task of the Commission becomes even more difficult.
The Commission has frequently indicated that unless other
convincing evidence is introduced by the claimant, the book value
is the most appropriate determinant. This approach should not
be surprising. Written evidence is likely to be available only in
the form of the production of certain of the financial records of
the corporation. Such records may offer little in the way of doc-
umentary evidence suggesting a going concern or replacement
value, although income statements are useful to calculate earn-
ings for capitalization purposes. The book value itself, without
any adjustment, is rarely an accurate reflection of the value of a
corporation to a willing buyer. Since the balance sheet of a corpo-
ration does not often reflect a continuing reevaluation of a cor-
poration's assets to reflect market value, book value will usually
provide an artificial indication of the value of the corporation."' 6
The valuation pattern of the FCSC throughout the Cuban
Claims Program suggests a substantial imbalance in the deci-
sional pattern in favor of those corporations filing claims subse-
quent to 1968. The view which the Commission followed prior
to the Cuban Claims Program, that of disallowing any valuation
other than book value, persisted with the Commission in its early
experience under the Cuban Claims Act, notwithstanding the
clear enunciation in the Act broadening valuation methods.
1 1 7
By 1969, the Commission had begun to accept evidence of re-
placement cost and going concern values, and by the following
year, the Commission had largely discarded its over-reliance on
book value. Had the Commission rigidly retained a book value
136. There is comparatively less likelihood that the book value will exceed
the market value since assets are or should normally be devalued when they have
suffered a predictably permanent loss of value.
137. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
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concept throughout the period of filing of claims, the final re-
sults might be more equitable. However, the Commission's pro-
gressive modification of its approach ultimately admitted claims
based on increasingly higher capitalization rates which amount to
multiples of book value.' Even within the Commission's pe-
riod of acceptance of capitalization multipliers, the progression
toward a higher allowable figure is apparent.139  Later claimants
will therefore receive a larger pro rata share in any ultimate set-
tlement. This change in the Commission's willingness to accept
going concern values will be illustrated in the discussion below of
the evaluation of corporate entities.
While the early claims decisions under the Cuban Claims
Act do indeed reflect a Commission reliance on book value, some
claimants offered only balance sheets as evidence, with no at-
tempt to suggest the adoption of an alternative approach to meas-
ure the losses. The Commission should not be criticized for ac-
cepting a book value when it is requested by the claimant, and
it does not appear to overvalue the assets. Criticism is fair, how-
ever, for the Commission's early insistence that book value was the
only proper method of evaluation.
In the Claim of Parke, Davis & Co.,4 0 the claimant's reliance
on the balance sheet was accepted by the Commission with a deci-
sion based on a book valuation of the capital stock. The Com-
mission stated that "an examination of the balance sheet reveals
that it accurately enumerated the assets, tangible or intangible, and
all the liabilities of the enterprise."' 1  Since the corporation had
operated only since 1955, there was some justification for believ-
ing the assets had not significantly changed in value in the seven
years prior to nationalization. The decision does illustrate, how-
ever, as do decisions of the FCSC prior to the Cuban Claims Act,
the Commission's overwilling acceptance of a balance sheet test
on the rather curious grounds that the balance sheet accurately
reflects a "true" picture of the assets and liabilities of a company.
Such a position ignores the likelihood that the assets would reflect
market value, since the firm presumably has utilized standard
accounting procedures in preparing its annual statement, which,
for example, do not normally consider appreciation of assets. The
early pattern of the Commission in accepting book value as a true
value resulted in a disturbingly consistent overreliance on book
138. See text accompanying notes 177 et. seq.. infra.
139. In 1969 and 1970, the accepted rate was ten. By 1971 the Commission
had increased the multiplier to 15, see text accompanying note 188 infra.
140. 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 32.
141. Id. at 33.
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value, accepted as a crutch to avoid facing the difficult methods
of substantiating going concern value or replacement cost, even
where these methods more accurately reflect the market value of
the corporation. The more recent experience has been a welcome
relief from this static approach to valuation.
The burden of proof in establishing the market value is
clearly placed on the claimant. Although the reported decisions
may suggest an over-reliance on book value by the Commission,
this cannot be affirmed in the absence of proof of a history of
unsuccessful attempts by claimants to establish a value greater
than that reflected in the books. While the initial decisions do
indeed hint at a failure on the part of the claimant corporations to
urge alternative methods, as much as they suggest an unwilling-
ness of the Commission to accept alternative evidence, subse-
quent decisions of the Commission evince the increasing use and
acceptance of evidence of going concern value. It is difficult to
conclude, from a reading of the reported decisions, whether this
change is attributable to an evolving change in philosophy by
the Commission toward a more sophisticated approach, or to the
presentation of the cases by the claimants themselves. Several
decisions suggest that it was a little of both.
The Parke, Davis decision, based on book valuation of stock,
was used by the Commission as a standard in subsequent deci-
sions, such as the Claim of Avon Products, Inc., rendered shortly
after the Parke, Davis decision.142 In the Avon claim, the docu-
mentation presented to establish the amount of the claim again
focused on the most recent balance sheet. No apparent attempt
was made to convince the Commission either that any of the as-
sets were undervalued or that there was a going concern value.
The Commission once again relied on the balance sheet to deter-
mine the book value of the corporation.
Both the Parke, Davis and the Avon claims suggest that the
Commission was accepting the book value method proferred by
the claimant, rather than refusing to adopt a going concern ap-
proach. However, one claim during this early period does sup-
port a conclusion that the Commission was itself initially reluctant
to accept methods of valuation other than book value. In the
Claim of General Milk Co., an attempt by the claimant to urge
the adoption of a capitalization multiplier was rejected as insuf-
ficiently supported by evidence.'14  The Commission did, how-
ever, begin in 1968 to respond to requests to value particular as-
142. 1967 FCSC ANN. REP. 35.
143. Dec. No. CU-1043 (Jan. 24, 1968).
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sets by alternative methods of valuation. In early 1967, in the
Claim of Sherwin-Williams, the Commission rejected such a
plea. 144  The claimant had introduced an insurance appraisal of
buildings and equipment, pleading that the book value figures for
these assets were based on tax considerations rather than replace-
ment costs. The Commission held that there was insufficient jus-
tification for using the replacement figure since the company had
"to within thirteen days of nationalization, relied on figures uti-
lized in tax considerations and which have permitted profits to
the claimants, some of which still appear on the balance sheet.""'
The Sherwin-Williams reasoning of the Commission was adopted
in the proposed decision in the Claim of the Berwind-White Coal
Mining Co., also in early 1967.1'" The Commission stated that
there was no reason to alter the value of several of the assets,
whose figures had been relied upon by the claimant's predecessor
within 24 days of the nationalization. While consistent with the
Commission's previous decisions, it is to the Commission's credit
that it acted upon a convincing plea to lessen its reliance on book
value and, in its final decision in 1968, allowed an upward evalu-
ation of several parcels of land.147
The initial movement away from book value as the sole de-
terminant of valuation predictably occurred in the valuation of
that asset which is most frequently undervalued, real estate. Car-
ried on the books of a corporation at its purchase price, land is
consistently undervaued on a balance sheet. Convincing the
Commission to accept a different valuation for land was far more
likely to meet with success than for such intangible assets as good-
will, however legitimate. Furthermore, in the case of the Cuban
claims, professional real estate appraisers who had fled Cuba
were available. As indicated above, their appraisals received
substantial weight in the valuation of real estate, particularly ur-
ban land in the Havana area and sugar and grazing properties in
the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that the final decision
in Berwind-White allowed appreciated values for real estate. The
claimant appeared at an oral hearing subsequent to the proposed
decision and, with the addition of witnesses, documents, apprais-
als, corporation correspondence and third party estimates, estab-
144. Dec. No. CU-31 (Feb. 1, 1967).
145. Id. While an insurance appraisal valuation based on replacement cost
less depreciation should be more reflective of a fair value of the equipment than
book value, the insurance valuation may also reflect a desire on the part of a
company to value its equipment at more than its market or replacement value.
The idea of over-valuation of assets for insurance purposes is not unknown.
146. Proposed Decision, Dec. No. CU-30 (Jan. 25, 1967).
147. 1968 Final Decision, FCSC ANN. REP. 28.
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lished to the satisfaction of the Commission an increased value
of several parcels of land. The result was an increase in the
valuation of some land by 50 percent and in other land by nearly
double the original book value.
148
The final Berwind-White decision established, at a minimum,
the willingness of the Commission to consider substantial evidence
showing an appreciated value of particular assets included in the
balance sheet. It did not represent any breakthrough in terms of
a willingness to reject the balance sheet for a capitalization of
earnings method, utilizing recent income statements. Indeed, in
the above mentioned Claim of General Milk Co., decided only a
month before the final Berwind White decision, the Commission
rejected the claimant's request that after-tax income and average
royalty income for three years preceding the loss be multiplied
by a factor of 15 in order to arrive at a fair shareholder value.'4 '
The Commission declined to act favorably on claimant's plea on
the basis that there was no evidence supporting the claimant's
method of valuation and that book value represented a more ac-
curate form of valuation.
The continued reliance on a balance sheet test by the Com-
mission was not an attempt to determine the claim at less than fair
value, but rather a reluctance to accept less convincing evidence
than the Commission believed a balance sheet test provided.
Where the Commission could be persuaded that particular items
in the balance sheet had been undervalued, it increased their val-
uation even though the final decree resulted in an amount in ex-
cess of that which the claimant had requested. In the Claim of
Ruth Anna Haskew,'5 ° the Commission dealt with the unusual
situation where the claimant was a shareholder, but the Commis-
sion possessed substantial financial documentation from the com-
pany, which had also submitted a claim in behalf of certain other
shareholders. Company information available to the Commis-
sion included a report for the year ending September 30, 1960,
which had been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and listed net assets as $19,441,408. The company asserted,
however, that the gross assets were $93,746,321.54, and, deduct-
ing the liabilities contained in the SEC report of $2,357,811, the
148. Id. at 29. The Commission rejected additional claims involving other
property and adopted book value amounts included in the proposed decision.
149. Dec. No. CU-1043 (Jan. 24, 1968).
150. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 31. The claim was presented by a shareholder
of Cia. Azucarera Vertienties-Camaguey, a Cuban corporation. The cor-
poration filed its own claim which was denied for failure to establish itself as a
national of the United States. Claim of Vertientes-Camaguey Sugar Co., 1968
FCSC ANN. REP. 84. For other results where claimant received more than re-
quested, see Claim of Raymond S. Lupse, 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 62.
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net asset valuation should be $91,388,510.54. While the Com-
mission might well have accepted the report filed by the SEC as
conclusively designating net assets, particularly since the accepted
date of the expropriation was August 6, 1960, it instead allowed
the asset listing as asserted by the company, with the exception
of a substantial figure for property, plant and equipment. The
September 30, 1960 statement listed property, plant and equip-
ment at $15,161,039, approximately one-sixth of the $84,427,-
311.89 value assigned to property, plant and equipment by the
company. The company asserted that the September 30, 1960 re-
port listed those items at a 1937 reorganization plan value, and
that they were consequently considerably lower than the actual
value even at the time of the report. The company's proposed
figures were substantially based on two appraisals by Parajon,
but the company failed to deduct depreciation of manufacturing
properties which reduced the total by $23,897,253. The Com-
mission's final decision adopted nearly all of the figures proffered
by the company, less the above mentioned depreciation for man-
ufacturing properties. The individual shareholder claimant had
submitted a claim based on less substantial information and re-
questing a lower amount for her 37 shares. The Commission
utilized the higher figure for the determination of the claimant's
loss. The Haskew claim is unique in that, although the company
did not itself qualify as a national, it did in fact file a claim and
therefore present its records to the Commission. Shareholders
who must bring individual claims usually find it impossible to
obtain corporate documents other than an annual balance sheet.
The Haskew claim illustrates the benefit that may accrue to a
shareholdeir where additional information is available. The com-
pany's unsuccessful claim bore fruit for the claim of its individual
shareholder.
While the Commission may appear to have expanded its ap-
proach to evaluating assets by 1968, in August of that year it had
an opportunity to clarify its position on the inclusion of such as-
sets as goodwill. In the Claim of Bartlett-Collins Co.,' the
claimant submitted balance sheets and income statements for two
Cuban corporations for the year 1960, including as assets good-
will and organizational expenses. The Commission stated that
"in the absence of other evidence, the Commission concludes that
the book value is the most appropriate basis for valuation."' 52
The Commission was particularly concerned with the inclusion
of an asset of goodwill in one corporation at $110,000.00. The
concern was not without reason; that company's income state-
151. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 39.
152. Id. at 41.
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ments disclosed that the company was operating at a loss. The
Commission stated that "except as a bookkeeping entry, there is
no basis in the record for finding that the subject company had
any 'good will' value."' 53  The Commission also rejected the item
of organizational expenses, which it stated was merely a book-
keeping expense item and, therefore, should not be considered
an asset for the purpose of certification of a loss.' 54 The good-
will item was apparently not purchased goodwill, but an attempt
by the claimant to provide for the goodwill acquired during its
years of operation. In the former case, where goodwill is pur-
chased, standard accounting procedures allow its inclusion as an
asset. Accounting procedures do not, however, allow either an
upward reappraisal or the creation of goodwill. Where goodwill
is in fact evidenced by substantial profits, recognizing that for ac-
counting procedures it may be inappropriate to consider it an as-
set, the determination of the value of the stock by a going concern
method will result in the effective inclusion of goodwill as an as-
set. The Commission's rejection of goodwill based on losses of
the corporation correctly suggests that the alleged goodwill asset,
if it ever existed, should have been reappraised and reduced,
possibly to the point of its total elimination.
The Claim of the First National Bank of Boston' 55 finally
brought to the Commission a case where a going concern value
was both requested, and, after much persuasion, ultimately recog-
nized by the FCSC. The adoption by the Commission of a mul-
tiplier represented a major success for claimants; the means was
established for future claimants who were able and willing to ex-
pend the effort to clearly present convincing evidence of going
concern value to the Commission, and thereby to obtain a valua-
tion far more representative of market value than the FCSC's
history suggested was possible.
The claimant bank, supporting the claim for loss of its six
branches in Cuba by showing a book loss value of $6,703,300.26,
amplified the loss by providing a "Statement of Condition" of the
branches which included substantial details of resources and lia-
bilities. The claimant indicated, however, that it was not basing
its claim on book value but rather on a going concern value.
The bank acknowledged that the branch banks were difficult to
appraise precisely on a going concern basis but stated that there
could be no doubt that the value of the branches was far in excess
of their book values. The bank then suggested that the going
concern value could be determined by alternate methods, either a
153. Id. at 44.
154. Id.
155. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 56, rev'd, 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 33.
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direct earnings method (using a multiple of the average earnings
of the bank for several years-the common capitalization multi-plier) or by the rate of return/net worth method (calculating the
relationship of the bank's rate of return on its invested capital
and the price of stock in relation to its net worth). The claimant
urged a comparison between their own branch banks in the UnitedStates and a representative sampling of other foreign banks op-
erating in similar circumstances. A critical factor was that otherCuban banks could not be analyzed; no stock of Cuban banks
was publicly traded during the period in question, and, therefore,
it appeared necessary to look at other United States and/or foreignbank stock prices, particularly those of Latin American banks.
Claimant indicated that utilization of one of the suggested proce-dures would justify a going concern value of the branches in the
amount of $12.2 to $12.6 million, depending, respectively, upon
the adoption of the direct earnings method or rate of return/net
worth method.
The bank reached these figures by clear and easily compre-hended calculations. For the direct earnings method the bankintroduced evidence of earnings of its branches over a five year pe-
riod between 1955 and 1959. The earnings established a 24.5percent return on the Cuban investment. Claimant then sug-gested consideration of averaging the earnings multiples of 9.9for three Latin American banks, 12.7 for a composite of 46
United States banks and 15.9 for four growth banks in the UnitedStates. On this basis it arrived at a value of the branch banks of$12,603,096. Using the rate of return/net worth method, the
claimant indicated that there was a direct relationship be-
tween the return on invested equity capital (net worth) and theprice at which stock was sold in relation to net worth. Claimant
urged, calculating the average computed value for the same com-parison bank, a figure of $12,222,126 for the Cuban branches.Stating only that it was not convinced that the proposed methods
afforded "a valid and equitable evaluation,"' 56 the Commission
rejected the valuation and found the $5,651,384.36 book value
the more appropriate value determiner.
The bank objected to the Proposed Decision, and particu-
larly to the value placed upon the six Cuban branches by theCommission. Additional parties filed briefs as amicus curiae and
oral testimony was presented by both counsel for the plaintiff and
amicus.15 7 The Commission, which had been vague in its reason
156. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. at 62.157. Counsel for International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, yet tohave its claim adjudicated, filed an amicus curiae brief and appeared at the hear-ing. An additional amicus curiae brief was later filed by counsel for Colgate-Palmolive Co. Claim of First Nat'l Bank, 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 33, 34.
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for rejecting the going concern theory, revealed that its reluctance
had evolved from the difficulty in determining the proper multi-
ple, as well as the inability of the bank to make a comparison
with other Cuban banks.15 The admission of concern regarding
a "proper multiple" at least suggested a willingness of the Com-
mission to use multipliers, although it did not suggest what form
of proof would have been necessary, nor how high a multiple
might have been allowed. The Commission's concern regarding
the inability of the claimant to compare its banks with other Cuban
banks is understandable although unintentionally destructive. If
all competitive industrial claimants were required to introduce
comparisons with other similar businesses to convince the Com-
mission to accept a going concern value, in those most complete
nationalizations, such as Cuba's, there would be no hope of suc-
cess. No business would remain to serve as a comparison. If
the Commission were to allow the use of a multiplier by compari-
son data only, then banks outside of Cuba would have to be used.
The multiplier requested by the claimant bank evolved from
data from growth banks and United States banks, where the mul-
tipliers were higher than for the three proposed sample Latin
American banks. The Commission might well have accepted the
average of the Latin American banks, without rejecting the multi-
plier concept entirely, although a sample of only three is certainly
not an exact projection. Such a limited sample should be more
reliable, nevertheless, than the book value figures resorted to by
the Commission in the Proposed Decision.
At the oral hearing subsequent to the Proposed Decision,
one expert witness suggested using the capitalization of earnings
method with a lower multiplier, basing his view on the risk in
conducting a banking business in a foreign country, the subjection
of the enterprise to close governmental regulation, currency con-
trols, and possible fluctuations in the currency of the foreign na-
tion. Suggesting a multiple of ten, the witness indicated that the
Cuban branches had in fact yielded a greater return on invest-
ment than the total international operation of the claimant bank,
and that the use of a multiple of ten concededly represented a
"crude and arbitrary adjustment, and was entirely a matter of
judgment."1 9  The multiple of ten provided a going concern
value of $9,336,810 applied to the average annual earnings dur-
ing the five year period from 1955 to 1959, or $9,948,550 if ap-
plied only to the branches' 1959 earnings.
158. Id. at 35.
159. Id. The higher risk would suggest a need for a higher rate of return
and therefore a lower total capital than with a low return.
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The alternative method proposed for calculating the value,
rate of return/net worth, had been rejected by the Commission
for similar reasons in its Proposed Decision. That method de-
termined the fair market value of the branches from a fair market
value of the entire enterprise on the basis of comparison of net
income. Claimant recalculated this value for the oral hearing,
reducing the net amount because its original figure failed to show
the effect of 1959 United States income taxes on the net income
of the branches. The adjusted fair market value for the branches
was determined by this method to be $7,999,320.
The Final Decision of the Commission recognized the inap-plicability of the book value in this particular case, and adopted
the second offered alternative, rate of return/net worth. The
Commission used an adjusted value of the Cuban branches bydetermining the fair market value of the enterprises from its entire
net income, and allocating the same amount of market value to
the Cuban branches as their income bore to the total income of
the enterprises. 6 ' While the decision is clearly important and
the Commission should be credited with its willingness to consider
alternative methods to book value, it distinctly is not an adoption
of a multiplier applied to a capitalization of earnings method of
valuation.
In the interval between the rendering of the Proposed and
Final Decisions in the First National Bank of Boston claim, the
Commission continued to apply the test of book value with in-dividual asset adjustment test. In the Claim of IBM World Trade
Corporation,'6' the major portion of the $7,866,167 claim was
an entry of $5,881,949 for "Data processing rental machines."' 1 2
Claimant argued for a valuation method based on the sale price
of the machinery as of 1959, depreciated by an average of 50percent, with the net increased by adding estimated freight
charges and Cuban customs duties. The claimant believed that
the original book value of the machines did not represent their fair
value even at the time of the original capitalization. The Com-
mission nevertheless rejected the argument, stating that the loss of
machines and equipment should not be calculated on the basis of
replacement costs but on the basis of cost less depreciation. As
160. In addition to the review of the branch bank valuation, the Commission
repeated its denial of the claim for a debt of the Cuban Telephone Company,id. at 36. The Commission reversed, however, its original denial of a claim for adebt owed by Mid-Century Service, Inc. The original reasoning had been for
reasons similar to those in the claim for the debt of the Cuban Telephone Com-pany. On review, the Commission held the debt had been guaranteed by a since
nationalized company and Mid-Century had become insolvent. Id. at 37.
161. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 69.
162. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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authority, the Commission referred to an early claim by IBM,
filed under the War Claims Act for losses sustained during World
War 11.163 While the result was an adjudication of a cost of pro-
duction of $2,960,000, substantially less than the company's as-
sertion of the aggregate sales price of the machines at $6,944,255,
the Commission's more favorable depreciation allowance reduced
the amount by only $854,654, while the company had calculated
a depreciation of $2,314,729.164 The Commission rejected the
company's request for inclusion of $1,252,423 for freight charges
and Cuban customs duties on the grounds that when a data proc-
essing machine was initially leased, the customer paid all import
charges in addition to the monthly rental fee. The Commission
stated that there was "no justification to increase claimant's loss
with the amounts necessary to cover the estimated cost of freight,
insurance, and Cuban customs duties, needed to import new ma-
chines in order to continue its business operations as prior to the
date of loss." '165 In addition, the Commission totally rejected an
asset listed as "Invoice clearing," which purportedly represented
additional assets which the claimant was "unable to classify" be-
cause of a lack of sufficient data, and an item for the expected in-
crease in profits between the date of the submitted balance sheet
and January 26, 1961, the date of the nationalization. The Com-
mission denied this portion of the claim on the grounds that pros-
pective earnings were not recoverable under the Act. Other deci-
sions of the Commission through 1969 similarly do not evidence
a development of the First National Bank of Boston result. The
claimants' demands were primarily based on individual asset valu-
ations, rather than going concern values.
The question of the allowance of organizational expenses
was resurrected in the Claim of Libby Holman Reynolds.
166
While the Commission stated that "in some cases organization ex-
penses are not allowable,' 167 in this case they were allowed be-
cause they had been incurred in the creation of the chain store
operation which was continued as a commercial operation by the
Cuban government. The Commission reasoned that since the
Cuban government was receiving the benefit of the creation of
the claimants' chain store, organization expenses were indeed an
asset of the nationalized corporation. It would therefore appear
that the Commission's decision to include organizational expenses
may be dependent upon the decision of the Cuban Government
163. Claim of IBM World Trade Corporation, Claim Nos. W-7358-W-7367,
Dec. No. W-17015.
164. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. at 73, 74.
165. Id. at 74.
166. 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 24.
167. Id. at 27. See Claim of Bartlett-Collins Co., 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 39.
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as to whether the particular corporation is a viable one in theframework of the newly created Cuban socialist economy. It
seems patently unfair for a corporation which has expended sums
in organizing a business, which under pre-revolutionary conditions
in Cuba would have been continued with a going concern value,
to be required to depend for allowance of certain assets on thedecision of the expropriating government as to whether the busi-
ness would be continued within the parameters of the new society.
In this same claim, although without any reference to its
reason for inclusion, the Commission allowed an asset of good-
will. The decision does not indicate, however, whether this par-
ticular goodwill was a purchased asset or one which the corpora-
tion inserted in the corporation's balance sheet to reflect an ac-quired goodwill over its period of operation. If the former, the
claim may be distinguished from the Claim of Bartlett-Collins
Co.,0 8 in which goodwill was rejected. If the latter interpreta-
tion of goodwill is meant, the Commission would appear to have
amended its earlier position and adopted a more liberal attitude
toward the inclusion of goodwill. 16 9 Because the goodwill in-
cluded in the Reynold's claim amounted to only about one-six-
teenth of the net worth, it may have been considered de minimus,
while the goodwill asserted in Bartlett not only amounted to one-
third of net worth, but the company had been operating at a loss,facts significant enough to raise an objection by the Commission.
The issue of organizing costs was again raised in the Claim of
Independence Foundation."' The Foundation's partly owned
steel mill in Cuba had not yet commenced production and, con-
sequently, there were no earnings to offset such expenses as
"work-in-progress" and "financing and organizing costs," both in-
cluded in the claim. Expenditures for travel expenses and legal
and other fees were included in the classification; similar ex-penses were rejected by the Commission in the Claim of Felix
Heyman, involving oil drilling ventures.' The FCSC was again
concerned that the Cuban Government benefited from the com-
pany. Noting that some reports from Cuba suggested that the
Government of Cuba continued the expansion of the corporation,
and that by early 1964 it was a sizable operation, the Commis-
sion commented that "although Antillian Steel Corporation had
168. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 39, see text accompanying note 151 supra.169. When the Commission began recognizing multipliers which provided an
asset value higher than book value would evidence, the Commission was recog-
nizing as an asset that intangible factor of value which a going business possesses,part or all of which may be attributable to goodwill. See, e.g., Claim of Johnson& Higgins, discussed in text accompanying notes 187-88 infra.
170. 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 38.
171. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 51. See also text accompanying notes 23 supra.
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bright prospects for the future as of March 25, 1960, the date
of intervention, it probably had not yet reached its break-even
point, and therefore had not yet recouped any of its 'starting up'
expenses, the benefit of which later accrued to the Government
of Cuba. ' '172  Although earlier statements of the Commission
appeared to have objected to the inclusion of the organization ex-
penses, the Commission finally concluded by allowing the book
value requested by the claimant, a value which offered a $100
per share valuation and reflected the inclusion of the organiza-
tion expense asset rejected separately. The decision may have
been based on the fact that the claim was filed by a Foundation
which had actually paid the claimed $100 per share for its stock;
the Commission stated with apparent compassion that such a
measure was "most equitable to the claimants; . . .. ,"' The
Commission thus has rejected organizational expenses when the
claimant company has not been in operation long enough to pro-
duce earnings to offset them, but allowed the expenses when the
company produced earnings to offset the expenses, or where there
was evidence that the Cuban government had continued the op-
eration of the company and benefited from the claimant's ex-
penditures.
The United Fruit Sugar Company,174 in preparing its claim
which finally totaled $85,100,147.09 for expropriated property,
utilized the services of Parajon, the same professional appraiser
whose appraisals the Commission had favorably accepted in
earlier claims.' 75 The Commission indeed stated that "[i]nasmuch
as the method used by Parajon e Hijo has been accepted in
other claims, that appraisal is followed to determine the value of
the land and improvements ... .176 The land and building so
appraised represented the greater proportion of the claim, amount-
ing to $74,447,243.30. Claims for livestock, merchandise, autos
and trucks, and other personal property assets appeared to have
been well documented by the company and were accepted as
stipulated by the corporation. The case illustrates a claim in
which the corporation has presented a detailed documentation of
its asserted list of assets, but has not asked for any going concern
value on the basis of income. Whether the claimant's failure to
request a going concern value was the result of unavailability of
documents establishing sufficient income, or a lack of knowledge
172. 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. at 42.
173. Id.
174. The Claim of United Fruit Sugar Co., 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 42.
175. See, e.g., Claim of Berwind Corp., 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 28 (1968);
Claim of Ruth Anna Haskew. 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 31; see text accompanying
notes 104-06 supra.
176. 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. at 45.
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of the then recent acceptance by the Commission of going con-
cern valuation, cannot be determined from the reported decision.
In a decision omitted from the FCSC's annual report for the
year, the Commission accepted a going concern value based on
the use of a capitalization multiplier. In the Claim of General
Dynamic Corp., the Commission first rejected a suggestion of val-
uation using a multiplier of from 10 to 15,'177 then accepted a
capitalization rate of 10 after new evidence. 17  The second stage
of the breakthrough, following the acceptance of going concern
concepts in the First National Bank of Boston claim, was com-
plete-multipliers were recognized. The next challenge for per-
spicacious claimant attornies was how high a rate the Commission
might accept in a given set of circumstances. Chances for suc-
cess appeared best with a very successful corporate operation.
The Commission faced another persistent bank in the Claim
of First National City Bank. 7 ' First National City urged that
the going concern value method was necessary because its eleven
Cuban branches had been operating since the 1920's and book
value for real property, furniture, fixtures, and equipment did not
accurately reflect the true value as of the date of loss. The claim-
ant suggested several methods for arriving at a fair valuation,
each, less offsets, closely supporting its asserted value of $12,-
899,132.30. Included was an asset of "Goodwill and going con-
cern value," listed at $5,812,279. 10.
While the Commission accepted a going concern value
method, it disagreed with the claimant regarding the appropriate
multiplier. The Commission rejected suggested multipliers of the
claimant of 13.3 and 15.1 because they were computed from sta-
tistics relating to five United States banks. The Commission ad-judged the better multiple to be closer to the 9.9 used for three
Latin American banks and computed the claimant's capitalization
at a rate of 10 percent. The rate was applied to earnings from1955 to 1959, and the loss was established as $9,510,000. The
capitalization method was again affirmed.
One of the largest claims presented under the Cuban Claims
Act was that of the Cuban Electric Company' in the amount
of $323,570,419.38. While the largest portion of the claim,$285,266,482, allegedly the value of the utility plant, was ac-
cepted by the Commission, several other items were reduced. Ad-ditionally, the Commission rejected amounts paid to employees
177. Proposed Decision, Dec. No. CU-3787 (July 30, 1969).
178. Final Decision, Dec. No. CU-3787 (Aug. 27, 1969).
179. 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 54.
180. Claim of the Cuban Electric Company, 1969 FCSC ANN. REP. 74.
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not as compensation for property taken as a result of the Gov-
ernment's actions, but rather for severance pay, pensions and for
other resettlement reasons. The final reductions for certain in-
debtedness reduced the judgment to $266,513,667.40. The claim
was based on an asset valuation without reference to goodwill or
going concern criteria. There was no discussion in the case of
attempting to establish a going concern value. Whether the sub-
stantial amount requested and allowed for the "Utility plant" in-
cluded a going concern element is not apparent from the reported
decision.
The method of evaluation of a corporation's leasehold inter-
est, using going concern value, was determined in the Claim of
Intercontinental Hotels Corp.18 ' IHC had purchased a hotel lease
for $3,600,000. Between 1958 and 1960 but prior to the con-
fiscation of its properties, it expended an additional $1,454,827
on improvements. The lease had approximately 29 years re-
maining after the date of nationalization. Evidence submitted by
IHC showed an extremely profitable operation, with net incomes
of $780,209.64 and $880,468.82 for 1956 and 1957, respectively.
Substantial net losses were shown in 1958 and 1959, and for the
brief period in 1960 prior to nationalization. All the losses were
attributed by the claimant to the reduction in tourism because of
the revolutionary movement of Castro and his ultimate take-over
of the country. The claimant urged a computation of a going
concern value for its leashold using a multiplier of 8 for its earn-
ings during the allegedly "normal" years of 1956 and 1957, which
resulted in a going concern value of $6,850,000. The Commis-
sion agreed that book value was inappropriate, and offered to in-
crease the multiplier from the requested 8 to 10. The offer was
not without a quid pro quo. The Commission refused to elimi-
nate the 1958 income from consideration since, although Castro
may have had an effect on the nation, he did not begin his na-
tionalization program until after assuming power in 1959. Con-
sequently, the Commission included the three year period 1956
through 1958, which produced an average annial net earnings
of $401,396.73. The reasoning of the Commission was clearly
inadequate. While the losses prior to the take-over on January
1, 1959 are not compensable under the Act, the claimant merely
requested the omission of the 1959 losses in determining the value
of the hotel business, which was not "lost" within the meaning of
the Act until 1960. It was a legitimate request by the claimant;
the year 1958 was not a normal year for tourism.182  The inclu-
181. 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 25.
182. This author was in southern Cuba in January of 1958. Few police were
seen in contrast to the state existing in Havana where searches were frequent and
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sion of the year's substantial losses caused a clear distortion in the
earlier proven earnings capacity of the hotel.
By capitalizing at 10 percent, the net valuation acceptable to
the Commission was $4,013,967.30. The Commission then
added to the amount those improvements made shortly before
intervention on the basis that IHC was unable to reap the re-
wards of the recent investment. The decision substantiates the
view that when the Cuban government continues a business, andit was common knowledge that the government was using the
hotels in Cuba for its own purposes, expenditures by the former
owners of the business which had not yet been recouped by profits
are allowable by the FCSC.
In the same claim, the Commission rejected the claimant's
request for fees for "management compensation." The company
requested a 12.5 capitalization multiplier for a $25,000 annual
fixed fee guaranteed to it for managing the hotel. The Commis-
sion, consistent with earlier opinions, indicated that this claim
was one for future earnings and not appropriate under Title V
of the Act.
The Commission's newly acquired attraction to multiplier
concepts even led it to request a statement of net earnings in a
subsequent decision,'83 perhaps in an attempt to use a multiplier
to establish the validity of claimant's apparently inflated assets.
The FCSC was beginning to learn the utility of the multiplier to
check inflated claims as well as to allow a more appropriate val-
uation than book value alone. In that case, claimant provided
an asset valuation by an officer of the corporations in addition to
two balance sheets for the years 1958 and 1959. The affidavit of
the claimant included accounts receivable, which had been noted
by the company's accountant at the end of 1958 as potentially
uncollectable and had been written off the books in 1959. Con-
cerned that the assets were inflated, the Commission suggested
submission of net annual earnings. The claimant responded by
indicating it would eliminate the accounts receivable assets from
its claim, which would reduce the total claim by approximately 40
police carried automatic weapons as a matter of course. On an earlier visit inFebruary, 1957, this author was searched several times during a period of a week,
although only at apparently high risk functions and places, such as at a plaza
awaiting a speech by President Batista, and when near an army barracks and LaCabafia, the prison used by Cuban presidents to house political prisoners. In
March of 1957, a tourist was shot by Cuban police during resistance to an attack
on President Batista in the Presidential Palace by insurrectionists. Curiously, thefamily of the tourist successfully filed a claim under the Act, since the govern-
ment of Cuba had admitted liability and agreed to compensate the decedent's
mother. Claim of John Korenda, 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 36.
183. 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 30.
[Vol. 13
FOREIGN CLAIMS
percent. At the same time, however, claimant increased its as-
serted loss approximately two-fold on the basis of an alleged go-
ing concern value. Claimant offered profit and loss statements
for the years 1953 through 1958, and calculated its total loss as
including the net worth of its subsidiaries on December 31, 1958,
the date of expropriation in the view of the claimant. Claimant
then added the estimated net profits of the subsidiaries through
December 31, 1969, and an estimated loss of earnings on those
net profits at six percent for that same 10 year period. The es-
timate was based on the theory that the earnings from the com-
pany could have been invested at an annual return of six percent.
The Commission totally rejected the method of calculation, in-
dicating that any profits after the date of the expropriation be-
longed to the government of Cuba and not to the claimant."
4
The Commission instead adopted an evaluation based on the av-
erage net earnings for a five year period ending December 31,
1958, capitalizing them at 10 percent. Then, rather surprisingly,
the Commission added to the capitalized value of the corporation
what it considered additional factors to be considered in the
amount of the "excess of liquid assets, such as cash and accounts
receivable, over current liabilities . . 185 Since the purpose of
the capitalization rate is to determine the total amount which a
corporation is worth, i.e., its assets over its liabilities, the addition
of any value to that amount would be effectively increasing the
capitalization rate. In this case the result was that the Commis-
sion increased the value of the corporations to an amount which,
applying the stated average incomes, reflected multipliers of ap-
proximately 14 and 12 for the two corporations.
Although the multiplier concept had finally become a stand-
ard fixture in the FCSC's repertoire of valuation methods, it con-
tinued to use book value, with adjustments, where requested or
appropriate. 1
86
The Commission evidenced its increasing willingness to ac-
cept non-book value approaches when presented with convincing
evidence. In the Claim of Johnson and Higgins, the FCSC in its
Proposed Decision,187 granted a goodwill value of $300,000 for
184. The Commission stated that Title V did not encompass future earnings,
citing Claim of Robert L. Cheaney and Marjorie L. Cheaney, Claim No. CU-
0915; Claim of Ford Motor Company, Claim No. CU-3072. The interest was
actually added, but in a different manner. Consistent with all claims, the Com-
mission allowed interest at the rate of six per cent to the date of settlement.
185. 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. at 35.
186. See, e.g., Claim of Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 44;
Claim of King Ranch, Inc., 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 59; Claim of West Indies
Sugar Corp., 1970 FCSC ANN. REP. 78.
187. Proposed Decisions, Dec. No. CU-3992 (Oct. 8, 1969).
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an expropriated insurance agency. The amount was slightly more
than the agency's annual gross income from 1955 to 1959. After
an oral hearing at which an insurance appraiser testified that an
agency is conservatively worth twice the annual gross income from
commissions, the FCSC accepted the multiplier of 2 and increased
the goodwill valuation to $600,000.188 The use of a multiplier of
2 should not be confused with the 10 multiplier which earlier had
been accepted by the Commission. Not only did the claim in-
volve the uniqueness of an insurance agency, but the 10 multi-
plier was applied to net rather than gross income. Since net in-
come of the insurance agency had averaged about $150,000 in
the immediate pre-Revolution period, the Commission used a mul-
tiplier of about 4 applied to net income to obtain goodwill. Even
that does not explain the multiplier, since it was used only to find
the value of goodwill, not the value of the business as a whole.
The Commission also allowed an amount representing net worth,
assets minus liabilities, of $89,099.23. The Commission's deci-
sion thus appears consistent with its increasing pattern of an
awareness of the limitations of its old straightjacket, the book
value method of valuation.
The Commission's use of multipliers took on an added im-
portance in the Claim of Colgate-Palmolive Co., when the FCSC
allowed for the first time a multiplier of 15.181 Claimant ob-jected to a Proposed Decision by the Commission partially be-
cause the Commission used a multiplier of 10.0 Claimant ar-
gued that its Cuban subsidiary corporations' business had been in-
creasing and that a multiplier of 20 times net earnings of each
corporation or 18 to 43 times average net earnings for the suc-
cessful year of 1959 would be appropriate. The Commission was
convinced that higher multiples could be justified for corpora-
tions with demonstrated growth rates and allowed a multiplier of
15 for the 1959 net earnings. What is particularly significant is
that the Commission not only increased the multiplier which it
had been applying previously by 50 percent, but applied that
multiplier only to 1959, apparently the best year for the claimant.
In earlier decisions, the Commission had used a span of yearsfrom which to gain an average for net earnings. The growth of
the claimant, however, aside from the increased multiplier, justi-
fied the use of only one year in the Colgate decision.
Although the Colgate decision was not the breakthrough
represented by the Commission's initial recognition of multipliers,
188. 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 40.
189. Dec. No. CU-4547 (Feb. 3, 1971), reported in 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 627(1971).
190. Dec. No. CU-4547 (March 4, 1970).
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it is important in that the Commission was willing to consider
multipliers other than the ten factor which was first adopted.
The FCSC has appropriately lessened an apparent rigidity in rely-
ing on relatively fixed concepts of valuation. A claimant in fu-
ture programs may expect acceptance of a well-documented and
persuasively argued claim which requests the utilization of a mul-
tiplier appropriate to the particular circumstances of the claimant.
If recent profitability justifies a higher multiplier, then, as in the
Colgate decision, the FCSC may be expected so to decide. How-
ever, Colgate remains a sale precedent. Subsequent to that de-
cision, the Commission did not have, or did not exercise, an op-
portunity to adjudicate a similar claim.
CONCLUSION
In June, 1972, the claims period expired and the work of
the Commission under the Cuban Claims Act was completed. In
retrospect, it was an important half dozen years in the developing
process of international claims. During the first few years of the
program, the Commission remained tied to a narrow book value
approach, a claims method utilized in past programs. The Cuban
Claims Act rejected book value as a legislatively dictated require-
ment, allowing more liberal and accurate methods by including
varying approaches to valuation, primarily the important going
concern value method. The Commission may be criticized for its
slowness in adopting going concern valuations, but that criticism
must be tempered. A study of the claims decisions suggests that
fault for the book value fixation must be shared with unimagina-
tive and possibly unprepared claimant counsel who failed to take
advantage of the alternative valuation methods of the claims pro-
gram for Cuban expropriations.
In retrospect, those applicants whose claims were adjudi-
cated during the final months of the program, and who pleaded
their claims with a sound use of the going concern value, may
have benefitted at the expense of the earlier claimants who were
limited to the narrow strictures of book value. With the ability
to re-open claims on the basis of new evidence, however, it would
appear that counsel for claims adjudicated during the early years
of the program on a book value approach could have filed for re-
hearings upon convincing the Commission that the going concern
value was more appropriate for the adjudication of their claim.
The expense involved in requesting the re-opening of a claim and
the preparation of a new plea based on a more involved method of
valuation would appear, however, to be prohibitive when. it is
realized that the likelihood of an eventual settlement of the claim
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for anything more than a very small fraction of the total is indeed
remote.
With the completion of the program, the Department of State
now possesses a thoroughly documented aggregate of claims to
utilize in future negotiations with Cuba regarding the restoration
of trade relationships between the two nations. The $1.8 billion
total of adjudicated claims is certainly an ominous amount for the
Cuban government to face in the event renewed relationships
with the United States are conditioned upon a fair settlement of
the claims.19'
Cuba is unlikely to recognize the total claims amount adju-
dicated by the FCSC as representative of the value of nationalized
property. The decisions of the Commission, as illustrated above,
did not involve either physical participation by Cuban represen-
tation, or a recognition that Cuban evaluation of the properties
would have produced different results. The concepts of valua-
tion utilized by the Commission may not have been the most ap-
propriate for valuing property located in Cuba. It would appear,
however, that at the time of the evaluation, the principles in Cuba
for determining property values were similar to those prevailing
in the United States. Consequently, the valuation methods seem
generally appropriate. An additional concern, however, is that
there was no party representing the interest of the taking govern-
ment who could seriously challenge the presented claims. Chal-
lenges will therefore undoubtedly be made in the negotiations for
a future lump sum settlement.
It is quite clear that there can be no substantial lump sum
dollar settlement. The Cuban economy, deeply in debt to the
Soviet Union, does not have the ability to effecutate more than a
token lump sum settlement. The amount of Cuban assets frozen
under the Cuban Assets Control legislation in the United States
was insignificant. It is likely that these funds will be part of any
future settlement. If any expectation of more than a token pay-
ment is to be realized, it will have to be derived from funds gen-
erated by renewed trade with Cuba which gives Cuba a signifi-
cant export balance. Cuba's only sizable export commodity con-
tinues to be sugar. If the settlement of the claims can only occur
with a reestablished sugar trade, there are certain problems which
will require solutions. Congress is unlikely to renew a trade pat-
tern which involves a subsidization of Cuban sugar. Pressures
from United States producers and from those nations which re-
ceived Cuba's allocation after 1959 will be certain to influence
191. 1971 FCSC ANN. REP. 35.
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Congress. The contrasting pressure from the successful claimants
for the establishment of trade relationships conditioned upon a
significant settlement create a perplexing situation. Furthermore,
Cuba can no longer be expected to respond to unilateral United
States economic or political decisions, and may well reject the
significant ties to the United States which would allow a fair set-
tlement. One of the strongest reactions by Prime Minister Castro
soon after the revolution was to the unilateral changes in the Cu-
ban sugar quota by the United States Congress. It appears cer-
tain that decisions in the future regarding the amount of sugar to
be imported from Cuba by the United States will be the result
of bilateral negotiations rather than unilateral Congressional dic-
tates. The Cuban government is likely to reject directing signifi-
cant amounts of sugar to the United States in order to avoid the
actuality or appearance of a return to economic dominance. In
the absence of an extreme change in the government in Cuba, it
is most likely that future trade patterns will begin with no more
than a minimum contact, and that whatever sugar agreement
evolves between the two nations will generate funds for the pay-
ment of only a very small proportion of the claims. Further-
more, if the claims are to be paid from a fund created by a United
States subsidization of the Cuban sugar economy, then the result
would be little more than were the United States government to
make direct payments to the claimants. The history of the Cuban
Claims Act suggests that Congress has been reluctant to provide
for a subsidization of United States foreign business interests in
this context.19
2
Whether or not the Cuban Claims Act adjudications will
be as significant a factor in dealing with the Cubans as some
United States spokesmen believe must await those negotiations.
If an ultimate lump sum settlement with Cuba amounts only to
a very small fraction of the total adjudicated claims, then it is nec-
essary to question whether the cost to the claimants and to the
United States has been worth the result. One benefit to filing
claims after a lump sum settlement is that if the settlement is ex-
remely small, many persons with minor claims will not waste
the effort in filing. The obvious problem, however, is that where
the settlement is long delayed, it is impossible to expect a high
degree of accuracy in presenting and determining the claims.
The theory of national claims commissions is strongly sup-
ported by most sectors; the continued viability of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission in practice, however, is largely de-
pendent upon the success of the Department of State in negoti-
192. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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ating sufficiently high percentage settlements with the expropri-
ating nations to justify the continued expense involved. The al-
ernatives for the determination and collection of claims suggest,
however, that the continuation of pre-adjudication by the FCSC
is justified in the expectation that future settlements will provide
at least a moderate percentage of the recovery of the adjudicated
claims.
